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Fetishizing the Electoral Process:                         
The National Labor Relations Board’s 
Problematic Embrace of Electoral Formalism 
Joel Dillard & Jennifer Dillard1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years, the labor movement has undertaken a behind-the-
scenes revolution in organizing strategy.  In an effort to stem the decay of 
union density and strength, labor has adopted a new and powerful method 
for organizing nonunion workplaces.  In response, the opponents of labor 
have attempted to outlaw this new method.  This article describes and 
critiques efforts by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “the 
Board”) and the U.S. Congress to address this issue and provides 
prescriptions for a more sensible approach to union organizing. 
There are two primary methods by which employees can form a union: 
the first is the Board-supervised election and the second is the card-check, 
or voluntary recognition, method.  The Board-supervised election was the 
overwhelmingly dominant method used by unions for decades, but a few 
years ago, some unions largely abandoned this method in favor of the card-
check method.  The success of these unions has led most unions to largely 
reject the slow, cumbersome, and ineffective Board processes for obtaining 
legal representation of the employees.  This has proved an exceptionally 
controversial move, in no small part because it has been a very effective 
union strategy.  
A card-check agreement is a contract between a union and an employer 
that provides that the employer will recognize the union as the employees’ 
exclusive bargaining agent if a majority of employees sign cards—contracts 
between the union and the employee—authorizing the union to bargain for 
them.2  This method, often coupled with a neutrality agreement in which the 
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employer agrees to refrain from campaigning against the union, has recently 
overtaken the Board’s election method as the most widely used and 
successful organizing scheme.3 
The success of the card-check method has not gone unnoticed by pro and 
antiunion factions within the federal government.  The unusually politicized 
NLRB recently decided Dana Corp. (Dana/Metaldyne), a case which 
dramatically undermines the voluntary recognition mechanism.4  In 
contrast, Congress is considering the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), 
which would not only overrule the Board’s decision in Dana/Metaldyne but 
also mandate employer recognition of a union with a card-check showing of 
majority support.5  
As we will show, both the pro and antiunion factions in the card-check 
debate focus their arguments on protecting employee free choice.  However, 
underlying political motivations guide the ways in which the parties in this 
debate identify and seek to protect that free choice, and, as a result, they 
seldom acknowledge the full implications of their arguments.  In this article, 
we describe those arguments and elucidate their implications for this vital 
area of labor law.  Ultimately, we will show that many insights provided by 
the pro and antiunion arguments in the card-check debate are valid but that 
the problems identified by these insights cannot be solved by either an 
election-only or a mandatory card-check recognition scheme.  Instead, those 
problems are deeply rooted in the employment system and must be 
addressed with a more thoughtful, probing analysis of the idea of employee 
free choice. 
First, we will describe two broad categories of methods used to identify 
employee free choice: formalism and realism.  Second, we will provide a 
brief history of the methods used to identify a union’s majority support, 
describing the political tensions that shaped those methods.  Third, we will 
discuss the current debate over representation recognition issues.  In this 
discussion, we analyze the Board’s historical and current methods for 
recognizing a union and critique the pro and antiunion arguments on the 
    Fetishizing the Electoral Process  821 
VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 2 • 2008 
voluntary recognition issue.  We also use the pro and antiunion arguments 
to discuss the shortcomings of the current methods of union recognition.  
Finally, we demonstrate the systemic issues inherent in the current 
recognition methods and propose some potential reforms to begin to rectify 
these problems. 
I. METHODS FOR EVALUATING FREE CHOICE 
Both Dana/Metaldyne and the legislative attempts to alter the union 
election process raise similar fundamental issues regarding the nature of 
employee free choice.  In Dana/Metaldyne, the Board considered whether 
an employer’s voluntary recognition of a labor organization based upon 
union cards merits an immediate recognition bar, which would protect the 
unit from any challenge for “a reasonable period of time.”6  The Board 
decided that the recognition bar is not warranted; this decision undermines 
the card-check campaign as a method for union recognition.7  The EFCA 
controversy in Congress focused on the question of whether cards or 
elections would better represent the will of the employees.8  
While there are important distinctions between the questions considered 
by the Board and Congress,9 they share two fundamental issues: first, how 
does one evaluate the effectiveness of a process in protecting free choice?10 
and second, how much protection of free choice is enough to consider the 
process “democratic”?11  The second question is beyond the scope of this 
article, but we will refer to it occasionally to place the addressed issue in 
context.  The first, more fundamental question is the focus of this paper.  As 
we will show, there are a number of methods that could be used to evaluate 
the degree of free choice in each of the competing processes.12  The method 
chosen in answer to this first question will very likely decide the outcome of 
the card-check controversy.  However, none of the loudest participants in 
this controversy acknowledge the subversive and revolutionary 
ramifications of their arguments for the structure of labor law.13 
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The precise meaning of the secondary question—the extent of free choice 
required for a “democratic” process—depends upon the context.  In the 
context of Dana/Metaldyne, the issue is how much free choice is required to 
merit a recognition bar.  In the context of the congressional debate, the 
question is how much free choice is required to merit mandatory 
recognition.  Because of this situational difference, a person could 
consistently apply the same method of evaluating free choice to both 
Dana/Metaldyne and the EFCA and arrive at a different result in each 
circumstance: a process could be democratic enough to merit an election bar 
but not democratic enough to merit mandatory recognition.  Nonetheless, 
this secondary question cannot be addressed until there is an answer to the 
primary question regarding the method for identifying free choice.  Sharp 
divisions in opinion about the secondary question, such as the one between 
the majority and dissent in the Dana/Metaldyne grant of review, are 
frequently a result of disagreement with regard to the primary question 
more than the secondary.14  However, this primary question is seldom 
explicitly addressed by the Board, Congress, or any other player in this 
debate, and, as a result, this fundamental source of disagreement tends to be 
eclipsed by the rhetorical debate over the secondary question.  Each side 
assumes that the answer to the primary question is straightforward and 
obvious and thus mistakenly believes that the source of disagreement is in 
the secondary question.15  
Because the main conflict in the debate over union recognition methods 
is based on the primary question—how to identify and evaluate free choice 
in a process—we will now explore the various available methods of 
evaluating how much free choice a procedure provides.  The methodologies 
for evaluating processes can be divided conceptually into two broad 
categories: formalism and realism.16 
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A. Possible Methodology: Formalism 
Formalism mandates that the evaluator—in this case, the Board, the 
legislature, or reviewing courts—create a set of assumptions, rules, and 
principles by which to evaluate any given process and identify free choice.  
These principles are generally determined a priori; viewed as neutral, 
natural, or obvious; and are necessarily seen as separate from any political 
considerations.17  This natural view is a necessary component of formalism 
because it gives the method its “legal” character.18  These assumptions are 
often borrowed from a settled area of law, giving them the additional 
“virtue” of appearing to be neutral by way of reified analogy.19  In addition, 
once this set of rules is established, the evaluator does not consider any 
contrary facts; indeed, the evaluator cannot acknowledge the existence of 
contrary facts or the neutral set of principles would become the product of 
the evaluator’s political judgment of which facts to take into account when 
forming the principles.  Formal methodologies often incorporate a binary 
logic with a strict pass/fail test and no acknowledgeable gray area.20  
Formalism also does not consider the results of the evaluated process.  To 
the formalist, if the process is valid, then the results must be valid.21  Any 
result is presumed to be “good” if it was created by a valid process.22 
While formalism may seem, at first glance, to be a definite and objective 
method for determining the validity of a process, there are many different 
formalist methods that could be chosen, with no principled way to chose 
between them.  These various formal methods—often drawn from other 
areas of law or from philosophy—can create very different results. 
1. Contract Formalism 
The classic formalist method for identifying free will is derived from the 
common law of contract.  This method has origins predating the birth of 
modern representative democracy.23  Under strict contract formalism, the 
evaluator asks only three questions to determine whether a person’s choice 
was free: 1) did he24 accept (sign) the contract?25 2) was he free from 
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physical duress when he signed the contract?26 and 3) was he an adult 
legally capable of contracting (that is, not mentally incompetent by law)?27  
If each question is answered affirmatively then the person freely chose to 
enter into the agreement and is bound by all its terms, regardless of other 
circumstances or the content of the agreement.  
Translated into the union recognition context, this contract-based 
formalism would provide that if an adult employee, without the threat of 
physical violence, signed a union card, the law would deem him or her to 
have chosen freely to sign the card.  However, the legislature has explicitly 
rejected the use of contract formalism in a wide variety of other union 
contexts such as the statutory ban on “yellow dog” contracts.28  The 
legislature has also declared in section 8 of the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) that certain kinds of economic threats are unduly coercive of 
employee free choice, even when the competent employee has signed a 
contract.29  Nonetheless, aspects of contract formalism are very much 
alive,30 and the applicability of some variety of contract formalism in the 
context of union cards has been assumed by the courts for decades.31 
2. Electoral Formalism 
Another formalist method for determining the will of the employees is 
borrowed from the most recent incarnation of the American electoral 
processes.32  Electoral formalists focus on the secret ballot aspect of 
American voting—one voter casts one anonymous vote.33  Other aspects 
may include the existence of more than one candidate on the ballot, giving 
the voter a formal choice when casting a ballot (regardless of how the 
candidates were chosen), or the availability of some public information 
about each candidate for voters who may want to research their choice.  Of 
course, the formalist will probably not evaluate the facts or opinions 
expressed in that information; the mere existence of information is 
sufficient.  This formalist method assumes that the American electoral 
process provides an ideal representation of the will of the voters and that 
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those who employ it seek to create an analogous process when determining 
majority status.34 
3. Formalism: Boundless Possibilities 
It is important to note that these two familiar formal methods—contract 
formalism and electoral formalism—have no special logical or natural 
significance.  The appearance that these methods have a special validity is 
historically contingent; an infinite variety of formal methods of equal 
logical validity is possible.  For example, one can imagine a form of 
“anarchist” formalism, in which a number of far stricter tests could apply 
than those of contract and electoral formalism.  One possible formulation 
would contain only one question: when a person makes a decision, will 
anyone punish that individual if he or she breaks the promise or changes his 
or her mind?  If so, the individual is not free under anarchist formalism.35  
In a sense, this radically libertarian formulation of free will is the opposite 
of contract formalism, because contract formalism is designed to ensure 
predictability by restricting future actions based upon prior “choices,” while 
anarchist formalism insists that the moment of free choice is the moment of 
action itself, and not a moment sooner.  Under this formulation, any attempt 
to limit action by legally constructing a false prior choice destroys freedom.  
Both methods of analysis are types of formalism based on a set of “neutral” 
or apolitical assumptions. 
Another potential type of formalism could be declaratory formalism—
based on the electoral process as it existed for much of the history of this 
nation—in which the choice is declared orally and publicly.36  This kind of 
formalism, like contract formalism, views public declarations as more 
reliable and less susceptible to fraud than secret balloting.  It encourages 
voters to act in the public interest and prevents voters from acting only in 
their own narrow self interest.  A free choice would be identified by the fact 
that it was orally declared openly and publicly, and records of the choice 
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would be open for inspection by any member of the public (unlike 
contracts, which are private). 
It is not our intention to claim that contractual, electoral, anarchist, 
declaratory, or any other formalism is better or worse than other 
methodologies.  The purpose is to understand the range of methods for 
addressing questions about free will and to recognize that none of these 
methods is, in fact, apolitical or prepolitical because political or policy-
based considerations will necessarily factor into the decision of which 
method is most appropriate.  Our society has not adopted a single method 
for resolving questions of free will; on the contrary, among the various 
areas of law, the notion of free will is an incoherent hodgepodge of 
methodologies.  Obviously, contract law is dominated by contract 
formalism, while contract formalism has little or no relevance to electoral 
law.37  In addition, there are numerous kinds of contracts that the courts 
have simply declared illegal, functionally limiting the role of contract 
formalism.38  
As a result, it is apparent that there is nothing “natural” about any variety 
of formalism.  If any particular kind of formalism was in fact a priori 
superior, there would be no reason to adopt that philosophy only partially, 
but instead it would be necessary to adopt that kind of formalism in all areas 
of law to utilize whenever a question of free will arises.  Only by 
recognizing that the proper process for determining free will depends upon 
the circumstances (the fundamental realist premise) is it possible to 
rationalize our society’s medley of approaches.  This argument has 
tremendous intuitive weight; the practical impact of uniformity would be so 
disruptive as to deter any but the most dogmatic formalist.39 
B. Possible Methodology: Realism 
The simplest description of realism is the rejection of formalistic 
fictions.40  Realism focuses on ascertaining, a posteriori, the success of 
factors in protecting free choice.  Generally, realism is relational rather than 
    Fetishizing the Electoral Process  827 
VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 2 • 2008 
absolutist.  Instead of determining whether a choice was free in an absolute 
sense, realism considers whether certain circumstances are more conducive 
or less conducive to free choice as compared to other circumstances.41  
Rather than reifying any particular process, realism posits that the suitability 
of a particular process for making free choices will be highly dependent 
upon the circumstances.  While formalists frequently reason by analogy 
without knowing whether the circumstances are functionally similar, realists 
refuse to accept analogy unless it can be shown that the situations are 
actually analogous.  Realism is focused on the result of its chosen process; a 
realist will alter the process to adapt to new evidence regarding the utility of 
the process.  Realism seeks to determine the proper process inductively by 
constantly reevaluating the process and determining whether it is best 
adapted to effectuating free choice under the circumstances. 
Realist methods for determining the free choice of employees do not 
attempt, as the formal methods do, to reason deductively from apolitical or 
neutral principles or law.  Instead, a realist will attempt to reason 
inductively from observable phenomena to develop the process that is most 
likely to produce the desired outcome.  However, because the realist rejects 
absolute definitions of free choice, the method is necessarily relational.  As 
a result, the realist will frequently use one or another formal method as a 
convenient starting point for analysis.  By comparing the results to a 
particular formal method, the realist is able to identify a reference point for 
discussing free choice.42  For example, a realist who is concerned about an 
employer’s ability to unduly influence an employee’s opinion about union 
representation may start with the formal election-based method of 
determining an employee’s will.  The realist will then redesign the election 
method to reduce the employer’s influence by limiting the employer’s 
ability to communicate opinions to the employee; by providing the 
employee with additional, preapproved information on the benefits of a 
union; or by limiting the employer’s ability to retaliate against an employee 
for his or her participation in the electoral process.  The realist would not be 
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attached to any one of these alterations but would further alter the process if 
the results indicate that the employees are still being overly influenced by 
the employer.  
As another example, a realist may start with contract formalism but seek 
to equalize the bargaining power of employees to ensure that the original 
choice of employment was made freely.43  He or she could alter the contract 
method to ensure that every worker and nonworker in the country is assured 
a minimum (and respectable) standard of living regardless of work status, 
which would reduce the coercion inherent in the decision to work in the first 
place.  A worker is less likely to formally consent by contract to an 
undesirable employment situation if he or she is certain that the failure to 
consent would not lead to starvation and ruin.44  The realist is not interested 
in the contractual process itself as a “good” and would alter or discard this 
process if another method were more successful in reaching the desired 
ends.  
Using the basic conceptual structure of formalism and realism, we will 
identify, explicate, and critique the methodologies of the Board, 
management advocates, and unions in the current controversy over card 
check.  However, an overview of the development of representation 
elections and card-check procedures is first necessary to place this issue into 
the proper historical context. 
II. HISTORY OF REPRESENTATION RESOLUTION 
A. Before the Wagner Act 
Before the federal government began regulating labor-management 
relations, unions achieved recognition primarily through actual and 
threatened strikes and boycotts.  Companies fought these organizing tactics 
with coercion of their own, including threats, propaganda, company spies, 
goon squads, and blacklisting.45 
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Representation elections were a relatively late development in American 
labor law.  The Railway Labor Act of 1926 did not include election 
proceedings,46 but some railways used private elections to determine the 
status of the unions.47  In 1934, the Railway Labor Act was amended to 
authorize the National Mediation Board to use secret-ballot elections to 
determine the representative of the employees.48  
However, outside the limited context of rail and interstate transportation, 
elections were not used when the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 
(NIRA) was passed.49  Section 7(a) provided:  
[E]mployees shall have the right to organize and bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and 
shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of 
employers of labor, . . . [and] no employee and no one seeking 
employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join 
any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or 
assisting a labor organization of his own choosing.50 
Similar language was used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which stated that  
though [the worker] should be free to decline to associate with his 
fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own 
choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, 
and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or 
coercion . . . .51  
While both the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NIRA provided for the right 
to organize, neither law discussed the creation of a government-managed 
electoral process.  
As a result, the National Labor Board (NLB), chaired by Senator Robert 
Wagner and charged with mediating labor disputes under the NIRA, did not 
initially have a government-ordained process for enforcing section 7(a).52  
The NLB instead proposed to leave the organization process to the workers.  
As stated by Board Secretary William L. Leiserson: “As to what steps are 
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necessary to take, we can only say that is a matter for the employees to 
decide for themselves.”53  
However, the deferential approach of the NLB was cut short by 
employers’ expanding use of company unions as a union-avoidance tactic.54  
Having decided that these company unions were illegal under section 7(a), 
the NLB attempted to design a representation process that would further the 
goals of the NIRA.  During this process, “the drift was unmistakably toward 
state-mandated representation—ultimately, a privileged bargaining structure 
that granted the right of exclusive representation to unions demonstrating 
support by a majority of workers and requiring the employer to bargain with 
unions so certified, and them alone, for those workers.”55 
These elections were unlike current representation elections with two 
options: “yes-union” and “no-union.”  Instead, these NIRA elections were 
primarily held to determine whether the company union or the outside union 
was the legitimate representative of the employees.56  Of the 546 elections 
held during the tenure of the NLB, 499 (83 percent) were between a 
company union and an independent union.57  Thus, in what would become a 
pattern, a combination of employer resistance to collective bargaining and 
interunion conflict would push the NLB to create a formal electoral process 
for resolving disputes. 
Elections were not necessary to validate a union as the legitimate 
representative.  The NLB used the elections to “jump-start the bargaining 
process . . . [as] a plausible means of settling disputes in workplaces where 
the principal issue was union recognition.”58  In fact, the NLB’s dispute-
resolution “Reading Formula” was devised as a settlement agreement to the 
1933 strike in the hosiery industry.59  This agreement included a provision 
that the NLB “would hold elections in which the workers would vote by 
secret ballot for representatives and those so chosen would negotiate with 
the employers to the end of executing collective bargaining agreements 
covering wages, hours, and working conditions.”60 
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The NLB continued to use this method of secret-ballot election to 
implement section 7(a), as a majority vote gave the prevailing union the 
legitimacy typically won by a successful strike.61  Because the NLB’s 
primary purpose was to mediate labor disputes, it was predisposed to use a 
method that would have the effect of avoiding strikes. 
This developing ad hoc method was formally approved by Executive 
Order 6580, in which President Roosevelt indicated that “representatives 
who are selected by the vote of at least a majority of the employees voting 
 . . . have been thereby designated to represent all of the employees eligible 
to participate . . . for the purpose of collective bargaining.”62  
The NLB instituted a policy of employer neutrality for these elections.  
Employers could not voice their opinions of the unions; nor could they offer 
employees rewards if the company union won or threaten retribution if the 
outside union won.63  The election was seen as a matter solely of worker 
concern.  As Francis Biddle of the NLB stated, “The employer has no place 
in elections.”64  In addition, the NLB attempted to ensure that employees 
themselves controlled the process by which the election occurred.65  Senator 
Wagner himself compared the question of employer involvement to the 
employees’ interest in the companies’ combinations: just as employees did 
not interfere with company mergers and monopolies, the employers must 
not interfere with the workers’ choices of association.66  Thus, the workers 
exercised their freedom of self-organization, and, to protect that freedom, 
the employer was denied any role in determining the outcome. 
B. The Wagner Act 
After the Supreme Court invalidated the NIRA, Congress passed the 
Wagner Act of 1935 to protect the right to organize.67  The Wagner Act 
rejected formalism.68  Like the NIRA, under the Wagner Act, an election 
was necessary only when the employer had questioned the status of the 
representative.69  The purpose of the election was investigatory; election 
results were merely evidence of majority support by the employees for a 
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particular representative.70  The employer had no “free speech rights” 
during the election proceedings.71  The election was viewed not as a 
campaign between union and management in which the employees would 
referee the outcome, but as an independent, entirely autonomous decision 
by the employees themselves, without interference by management.72 
In passing the Wagner Act, Congress rejected any kind of electoral 
formalism for determining the will of the employees.  The most important 
evidence of this rejection is the limitation of Board investigations to 
situations in which a serious dispute occurred regarding representation.73  In 
effect, this meant that the Board would intervene only when an employer 
refused to recognize the union voluntarily.  Board certification was not 
meant to be the exclusive method for becoming the exclusive 
representative;74 in fact, Board certification was presumed to be needed 
only on those rare occasions when there was an interunion conflict 
concerning who was the chosen representative of the employees.75  The 
traditional methods of voluntary recognition commonly practiced under the 
NIRA were entirely untouched by the Wagner Act.  It only added the 
additional layer of Board investigation (by election or other method) and 
Board enforcement as a last resort.76 
Another crucial feature of the Wagner Act evidencing the rejection of 
electoral formalism is section 9(c), described in an early committee report: 
“[I]n a dispute as to who are the representatives of the employees. . . . The 
Board is authorized to take a secret ballot or to use other suitable 
methods.”77  This provision was extraordinarily uncontroversial.  Only 
twice in the legislative history did private citizens, during hearings opposing 
the bill, object to this provision.78  This point of opposition was never 
echoed or mentioned by any congressperson. 
In context, this near-total silence is understandable.  Secret-ballot 
elections were a relatively recent innovation in the labor law context.79  In 
the Railway Labor Act as well, elections were only mentioned as one of 
many ways in which the Mediation Board could investigate the majority 
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status of the Union.80  Elections were merely evidence pertinent to the 
factual determination of majority support for the representative.  The 
provision of the Railway Labor Act presents this mindset pointedly:  
In such an investigation, the Mediation Board shall be authorized 
to take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any 
other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of their duly 
designated or authorized representatives in such a manner as shall 
ensure the choice of representative of the employees without 
interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the carrier.81   
Elections are explicitly mentioned only because they were thought to be one 
way to ensure that the employer has as little influence in the outcome of the 
determination as possible. 
The Wagner Act rejected formalism.82  The Board intervened only when 
the employer refused to bargain with the majority representative.  The 
Board was given flexibility to create methods for investigating employee 
choice.  The touchstone for evaluating these methods was a realist creation: 
the success of the method in eliminating any employer coercion or 
influence.  
C. Implementation of the Wagner Act Until 1947 
In the first two years under the Wagner Act, the Board used its discretion 
to develop methods for determining the factual question of whether 
employees had a choice of representative. 83  In each case, the method was 
selected to best fit the facts of the situation.84  Often, this meant that if the 
union could supply adequate evidence at the hearing to prove it had the 
support of the majority of employees, the union would be certified as the 
representative on the basis of this record alone.85  In other circumstances, 
the evidence on the record was inadequate to establish the majority 
representative, in which case the Board would hold an election.86 
This procedure comported with the realist policies and language of the 
Wagner Act, avoiding strict formalistic procedures that could be 
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manipulated to deny free choice.  Importantly, this procedure followed the 
prescription of Congress that the Board should use whichever method was 
best suited to the circumstances and develop a realistic approach to 
determining the will of the employees. 
However, in 1939 the Board began to change course.  The three-member 
Board split 2–1 in Cudahy Packing and Armour & Co., deciding that 
elections would be the only method for Board certification in some 
circumstances.87  
Although this doctrinal shift was certainly a move toward electoral 
formalism, it was only a slight move.  Even under the Cudahy/Armour 
doctrine, the Board still certified on the record when there had been an 
agreement with the employer for card check.88  After the cards were 
counted, the regional director typically posted the results in the workplace 
for five days in order to give employees a right to object before the union 
was certified.89  In addition, the vast majority of bargaining relationships 
continued to be formed without any formal Board action.  Even in those 
cases in which representation petitions were filed with the Board, nearly 
half were resolved without formal action.90  For example, in the final year 
before the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, 646 representation petitions were 
informally resolved through the card-check procedure.91 
Why did the Board move toward formalism?  Most likely, the Board 
chose the method best suited to serve its own institutional interests.  This 
was an extremely turbulent period for the Board, in which the Board’s 
impartiality and institutional validity were constantly under siege:92 if the 
Board consistently and rigidly applied the same method for determining the 
validity of union selection, it could blunt any accusation of bias.  As one 
former Board staffer and labor law scholar stated:  
 It has been said truly that the Board never had a chance to 
function in a “normal” period . . . . Instead it had first the bitter 
opposition of most of industry and the fight on constitutionality; 
then the deluge of cases after the establishment of the 
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constitutionality of the Act and the increase of union membership 
following the organization of the CIO; then, before it could get its 
work onto a current basis, the hampering congressional 
investigations; next the war; and, finally, the postwar avalanche 
and the renewed attacks upon the Act.93 
Perhaps the most important of these factors was the pervasive claim of 
bias.  Employers and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) both accused 
the Board of bias.  In the case of employers, these charges were often a 
politically expedient substitute for attacking the concept of collective 
bargaining itself.94  The AFL, on the other hand, felt extraordinarily 
threatened by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and was 
constantly suspicious that Board staff might be secretly sympathetic toward 
CIO unions.95  Continuing the pattern under the NIRA, interunion conflict 
combined with management hostility toward collective bargaining began to 
push the Board toward electoral formalism.96  Indeed, interunion conflict is 
one of the situations in which elections are most helpful, so it should not be 
surprising that Cudahy was decided during a period of serious conflict 
within the labor movement. 
The Board pragmatically looked to elections, one of the most respected 
modes of free-choice formalism in America, to assure stakeholders that its 
procedures were fair and entirely free from bias.  The Board deliberately 
tied its own hands in order to demonstrate to employers and the AFL that 
Board staff would not have the discretion to implement any unfair bias.  
However, as we will show, electoral formalism subsequently took on a life 
of its own, ultimately swallowing any realistic assessment of the need for 
institutional validity. 
D. The Taft-Hartley Amendments 
Passed in 1947, the Taft-Hartley amendments further extended the role of 
electoral processes in representation cases and statutorily cemented the 
Cudahy/Armour doctrine.97  More fundamentally, the Taft-Hartley 
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amendments indicated a shift from employee free choice as the sole 
objective for union selection to a balancing of employee free choice and 
employer free speech.  This shift allowed the union selection process to 
become a more formalized electoral battle in which employers had a 
recognized stake in the outcome, instead of being uninvolved in the process.  
A no-union outcome was an explicit win for the management, rather than a 
choice by the employees not to be represented by a particular union.98 
The Taft-Hartley amendments codified the Board election as the sole way 
a union could be certified by the Board as the representative of the 
employees.99  While a non-Board certified union could still demand 
recognition from an employer, the Taft-Hartley amendments also included 
benefits for Board-certified unions, such as protection against 
organizational picketing by rival unions and the twelve-month election 
bar.100  
As mentioned, Taft-Hartley also expanded protection for employers who 
wished to oppose the unionization of their workforces.  Six years before 
Taft-Hartley, the Supreme Court ruled in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & 
Power that while employers could not be covered by a sweeping rule of 
employer neutrality, regulation of employer speech was valid.101  
Employers were seen as a nonparty—an entity with no interest in the 
proceedings worthy of legal protection, similar to the employees’ nonparty 
status when the employer wished to join with another employer to create a 
combination.  However, under Taft-Hartley, employee organization became 
an electoral battle in which employers had a recognized role as antiunion 
advocates.  Rather than continuing to preclude employers from the 
organizing process as inherently coercive, Taft-Hartley required the Board 
to balance the interests of workers to organize freely and the interests of 
employers to voice their opinions of the unionizing effort.102  In addition, 
Taft-Hartley forbade the use of employer statements as evidence of unfair 
labor practices (ULPs), invalidating the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
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Virginia Electric & Power and the circuit court case Trojan Powder, cited 
with approval by the Supreme Court in 1945.103  
By reconceptualizing the employer’s role as a party in an election, rather 
than as a nonplayer in a selection process, Taft-Hartley ensured that 
employer interests would be encased by law in the election structure, 
allowing employers to engrain their inherent coercive powers in the union 
selection process.104  
The likely consequences of this reordering of the representation paradigm 
did not go unnoticed by the amendments’ opponents in Congress.  In 
particular, the free speech provisions of Taft-Hartley were hotly debated in 
Congress.  While the proponents of the bill claimed that Taft-Hartley would 
not result in increased coercion,105 the bill’s opponents were emphatic in 
characterizing the bill as a measure to decrease employees’ independence 
while choosing a union: 
 This bill ignores completely the undoubted fact which the 
[f]ederal circuit courts of appeals and the Supreme Court of the 
United States have repeatedly recognized, that employees who are 
dependent for their bread and butter on the job which it is within 
their employer’s power to give or withhold are sensitive and 
responsible even to subtle suggestions of the employer’s desires, 
and that employers need do no more than hint to assure that 
employees will obey them.106  
After Taft-Hartley, the Board and the courts expanded the meaning of the 
amendments’ assurance of employer free speech, validating the employer’s 
ability to restrict union organizers from his or her property,107 the 
employer’s right to hold captive audience meetings108 (and the union’s 
nonright to parallel reply),109 and the employer’s right to “noncoercive” 
employee interrogations.110  These developments ensured that the election 
process would not be free of coercion.  Under the Wagner Act, these 
employer actions would have been considered coercive and infringing on 
employees’ rights to free choice.  Under the Taft-Hartley amendments, 
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these employer actions are the employer’s prerogative to express an opinion 
in an election between a union and a nonunion workplace.  
After Taft-Hartley, the Court’s and the Board’s attempts to ensure a 
noncoercive election process have failed.  For example, the Board’s 1948 
attempt in General Shoe to maintain a legitimate electoral atmosphere by 
purporting to provide “laboratory conditions” in which to determine the will 
of employees has been unsuccessful in staving off the employer’s coercive 
influence in the representation process.111  General Shoe’s requirement of 
laboratory conditions to determine the will of the employees can be met 
while the employer makes dire predictions of ruin if a union enters the 
workplace, conducts captive-audience meetings, prohibits the union 
organizers from meeting with the employees in any functionally meaningful 
way, and interrogates employees “noncoercively.”112 
Thus, Taft-Hartley began the weakening of the worker’s right to self-
organization by replacing it with a worker’s right to be involved in an 
election process, conducted by an outside party, where the employer’s 
already inherent coercive influence is buttressed by legalized employer 
actions carefully designed to discourage the employee from voting for the 
union. 
III. THE MODERN METHODOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY 
A. Board Methods 
From its realist origins under the Wagner Act,113 the Board’s 
methodology has, since Taft-Hartley, slowly ossified into electoral 
formalism.  Indeed, the Board is on the brink of fetishizing its own electoral 
process at the expense of employee free choice.  This change is evidenced 
most clearly around the borders of the Board electoral process where the 
Board has held that nonelectoral indicia of employee support may be 
adequate to demonstrate majority status.  In this section, we will explore the 
ways in which these border areas have shrunk dramatically and, under the 
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current Board, are in danger of disappearing altogether.  In addition, we will 
discuss how, even within the electoral process, assumptions about what 
“free choice” looks like have become increasingly formalistic. 
1. Gissel Bargaining Orders and “Hallmark Violations” 
In Gissel, the Supreme Court ruled that an employer can be ordered to 
bargain when a prior union majority—generally shown by cards—has been 
destroyed by management ULPs.114  This was a very realist move; the 
Board and Court recognized that fair elections were not always possible, 
and they fashioned this remedy to allow themselves greater room to ensure 
employee free choice.115  Gissel bargaining orders have since been used to 
address, for example, employer ULPs such as threatened plant closures and 
discriminatory discharges of union advocates.116  By retaining the right to 
order bargaining when the union has lost an election but other evidence 
suggests that the union in fact enjoyed majority support prior to the 
commission of the ULPs, the Board indicates that it will, at times, bypass its 
formal mechanisms in favor of a fact-based, realist result. 
However, Gissel was ultimately not the realist victory it initially appeared 
to be.117  The Board has granted the Gissel remedy in only very limited 
situations, and its power to provide this remedy has been limited by the 
courts.118 
In Gissel, the Court developed a number of extremely restrictive bright-
line rules limiting the scope of the decision, probably to provide more 
legitimacy to the Board in the eyes of a suspicious federal court system.  
The Board subsequently began noting “hallmark violations” that, while not 
per se mandating a Gissel bargaining order, were indicative of the situations 
where the Board was most justified in providing the order.119  These formal 
indicators of a probable Gissel situation have become bright-line restrictions 
on the Board’s ability to issue bargaining orders when an employer’s 
unlawful actions have hindered an employee’s free choice.120  
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The term “hallmark” violations was first mentioned casually by the 
Second Circuit in an opinion denying enforcement of a bargaining order in 
which “there were no dismissals for prounion activities, no threats to close 
down or curtail the company’s operations if the Union should prevail, and 
no actual use of force or physical violence, which usually are the hallmarks 
in cases where bargaining orders issue.”121  Then, in the following year, the 
term appeared for the first time in a Board decision, in which the Board 
stated that “direct threats to close operations is [sic] the hallmark of the type 
of case in which bargaining orders issue.”122  This casual use did not 
suggest a new bright-line rule; however, in the next case in which the 
phrase was used, the Board claimed that  
[i]t has long been established that the threat of loss of employment, 
discharge of union adherents, and the threat of plant closure, all of 
which occurred herein, are likely to have a lasting inhibitive effect 
on a substantial percentage of the work force, and therefore are 
considered “hallmark” violations which support the issuance of a 
bargaining order, unless some significant mitigating circumstances 
exist.123  
At this point, the metamorphosis was complete; an isolated, passing use 
of a phrase had become a term of art and, ultimately, the current Board’s 
bright-line rule for justifying its refusal to issue bargaining orders even 
when the employees’ free choice has been severely impeded by other, 
nonhallmark, means.124  Using this highly formalistic approach, the current 
Board has developed a pattern of reversing many administrative law judges’ 
bargaining orders.125  In some cases, even when the Board finds that a 
Gissel order would have been appropriate, it denies the order for other 
reasons such as the length of time between the initial showing of majority 
support and the Board’s final decision.126 
2. Recognition Bar to Elections 
The recognition bar is a Board-created, judicially-approved method of 
ensuring that voluntary recognition is an effective means of forming a 
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bargaining relationship.  The recognition bar prohibits any election or other 
challenge to the majority status of the union for “a reasonable period of 
time” following the employer’s voluntary recognition of the union’s 
majority status.  In 1966, the Board instituted a recognition bar because 
“like situations involving certifications, Board orders, and settlement 
agreements, the parties must be afforded a reasonable time to bargain and to 
execute the contracts resulting from such bargaining.”127  The Board thus 
treated card-check recognition similar to the other methods of union 
recognition.  Due to the recognition bar, the Board and the federal courts 
have long warned employers against refusing to bargain during that 
reasonable period based on a doubt of continued union majority status.128  
The language used to describe the duration of the recognition bar, “a 
reasonable period,” was the same language used to describe a certification 
bar under the NLRB rules as they evolved under the Wagner Act.129  Thus, 
the recognition bar was one year in duration, equal to the certification and 
election bars.130  The Board considered the card-check process sufficiently 
reliable as evidence of employee free choice to justify treatment comparable 
to an election, a position completely inconsistent with electoral 
formalism.131  However, subsequent modifications have shrunk a 
“reasonable period” in the context of voluntary recognition, such that the 
term has come to mean two very different things with respect to elections 
and to card check.132  A union that anticipates having more than six months 
of bargaining following recognition is taking a serious risk:133 this shrinking 
voluntary recognition bar has created an incentive for unions to violate the 
Act by “prebargaining” contract terms informally with the employer before 
the union has obtained majority status.134  If the recognition bar were long 
enough, providing the union sufficient time to negotiate after recognition, 
there would be less pressure for the union to agree to these terms before 
attaining majority status. 
The voluntary recognition bar is an implicit rejection of strict electoral 
formalism because it supports and stabilizes relationships built on 
842 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE 
nonelectoral showings of support for the union.  Even into the early 2000s, 
the Board upheld the recognition bar for unions established by the card-
check process, based on the understanding that the card-check process 
would elicit the free will of the workers, stating that “we believe that . . . we 
are both promoting voluntary recognition and effectuating the free choice of 
the majority of the unit employees.”135  Circuit courts have also been 
willing to uphold the Board’s voluntary recognition determinations, based 
on the valid public policy reasons for the card-check process.136  
However, in September 2007, a party-line, 3–2 majority of the Board 
radically overhauled the voluntary recognition bar along electoral formalist 
lines.137  In this case, the employers Dana Corporation and Metaldyne 
Corporation voluntarily recognized a union that presented authorization 
cards signed by majorities of their respective employees.  Shortly 
afterwards, employees opposing the union filed a petition with the NLRB 
seeking an election.  The Board held: 
[N]o election bar will be imposed after a card-based recognition 
unless (1) employees in the bargaining unit receive notice of the 
recognition and of their right, within 45 days of the notice, to file a 
decertification petition or to support the filing of a petition by a 
rival union, and (2) 45 days pass from the date of notice without 
the filing of a valid petition.  If a valid petition supported by 30 
percent or more of the unit employees is filed within 45 days of the 
notice, the petition will be processed.138  
This ruling was not a complete victory for antiunion advocates, who 
argued that the voluntary recognition bar should be eliminated altogether.139  
However, the practical effect of the rule is to require a union to secure and 
maintain a supermajority of support of more than 70 percent of the 
employees for forty-five days in order to avoid a potentially coercive 
election campaign.  Union selection is virtually always contentious, and 30 
percent dissenting minorities are common, particularly before the first 
contract in newly organized workplaces.140  As a result, the new rules 
effectively eliminate the voluntary recognition bar in most circumstances. 
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The general counsel argued for a thirty-day window before application of 
the election bar but would have required a showing that the cards were in 
fact no longer representative of the choice of the employees by an election 
petition signed by a majority of employees.141  This option would have at 
least required that opponents of the union cast some doubt on the validity of 
the card majority; the rule adopted by the Board would require an election 
even where card majorities of up to 70 percent remain entirely undisputed. 
This new rule is founded squarely on the claim that card check is of 
“lesser, and in some cases questionable, reliability.”142  The reasoning of the 
Board is deeply rooted in electoral formalism and, as admitted by the Board 
majority, is not based on any factual probability that cards are actually 
inferior indicators of the employee’s true choice.143  The Board claims the 
card-check process is inherently flawed because, unlike elections, cards are 
(1) signed in public and subject to social pressure; (2) subject to 
misinformation or lack of information before signing the card;  
(3) accumulated over time; and (4) protected only by the ULP standards of 
the NLRA, rather than the laboratory conditions standards of the Board 
election.144  The Board also cites language from older cases to indicate that 
the election is a favored union selection method.145  In short, the conditions 
under which the union authorization contract is signed are unfair, and 
employees who unquestionably did sign the contract should nonetheless get 
a chance to change their minds. 
None of these reasons are coherent under contract formalism and reflect a 
clear commitment to an electoral formalist perspective.  There is no abstract 
reason that decisions made in public are less reflective of the true choice of 
the individual than choices made in private.  In fact, contract formalism 
relies on the public nature of the agreement to support the reliability of the 
decision.  Similarly, lack of information is irrelevant under contract 
formalism; every person has a duty to read and understand what they sign.  
Misinformation is only of importance if it rises to the level of fraud (a 
ULP).  Regarding accumulation over time, the Board argues that 
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authorization cards, unlike election results, are not a “snapshot” of 
employee opinion.146  However, an employee can repudiate an authorization 
contract at any time prior to recognition.  Thus, the cards signed at the time 
of recognition are also a snapshot of employee choice, though just a 
snapshot taken at a moment selected by the union.  However, generally 
when a person signs a contract, he or she is irrevocably bound: this is the 
fundamental value of a contract and is no different than an election in that 
regard.  Under contract formalism, laboratory conditions are not required 
before a contract becomes binding. 
The Board cites notice procedures prior to Board elections to support 
requiring notice of the window period after voluntary recognition.147  But 
the primary purpose of notice prior to election is to ensure that interested 
employees will be able to participate in the election so that the election 
accurately reflects employee opinion; in the card-check context, a majority 
of employees has already participated in selecting the union.  Thus, the true 
purpose of notice in this context is to give antiunion employees and outside 
agitators an opportunity to delay effective union representation and a 
second chance to pressure others into changing their minds and defeating 
the union. 
In justifying rejecting a thirty-day period in favor of a forty-five-day 
period, the Board reveals the utter arbitrariness of the new rule.  The Board 
states, in effect, that thirty days is “too short” to effectuate free choice while 
forty-five days is just right, without any reason for supposing this to be true.  
Why not 365 days?  Why not two days?  Without something more than a 
vague stab in the dark, there is no reason to think that any particular 
“second-guessing” period is sufficiently protective of free choice. 
While the current Board presents itself as a champion of employee rights, 
the Board is actually using a formalist principle to eviscerate employee free 
choice by ignoring evidence of clear majority support, thus denying the 
ability of management and unions to privately settle representation disputes. 
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3. Enforcing Agreements for Private Resolution of Representation 
Disputes 
For decades, unions have made a practice of negotiating “after-acquired” 
clauses under existing contractual relationships that would prescribe a card-
check process for voluntary recognition in new facilities acquired or formed 
by the employer.148  The clause is a waiver of the employer’s right to insist 
upon election, and it provides a binding alternative methodology for 
determining the free will of the majority of employees in the acquired 
unit.149  This doctrine follows logically from the legality of voluntary 
recognition (i.e., waiver of election) and the enforceability of 
union/employer contracts under section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley 
amendments.150 
Under the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of section 301,151 which 
provides for a private right of action in federal courts for “violations of 
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing 
employees . . . or between any such labor organization,”152 the lower courts 
applied section 301 to enforce voluntary recognition procedures even upon 
a contractual party who was not in an existing collective bargaining 
relationship.153  The language of section 301 makes no distinction between 
collective bargaining agreements and other kinds of agreements between 
unions and employers.154  As a result, the Board has enforced card-check 
neutrality agreements in which the employer agreed to voluntarily recognize 
the union upon a showing of majority cards, and it has also waived the right 
to an election or vocal opposition during the card campaign.155 
In recent years, the Board has taken every opportunity to restrict the 
reading or effect of after-acquired clauses.156  As support for ignoring what 
is often quite plain language indicating an employer’s waiver of the election 
process, the Board has pointed to “public policy” favoring elections.157  In 
contrast to appellate court opinions enforcing these agreements, the rhetoric 
of Board opinions has been starkly electoral formalist.158 
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In 2004, the Board accepted review of a waiver case, Shaw’s 
Supermarkets.159  The Board asked “whether public policy reasons 
outweigh the Employer’s private agreement not to have an election.”160  
This constitutes a direct attack on the legality of any contractual waiver of 
an employer’s right to request an election.  If the Board reaches this issue 
and decides in favor of the employer, the realm of voluntary recognition 
would shrink further still. 
In August 2006, the Board accepted review of a related (and somewhat 
redundant) case, Marriott Hartford Downtown Hotel.161  If decided in favor 
of the employer, this case would permit employers to demand an election at 
the moment a union requests a card-check agreement.  The Board stated that 
“[t]his case presents many of the same issues that the Board is addressing in 
several pending cases currently under Board review.”162  The Marriot 
Hartford case could overrule New Otani Hotel, which held that a union 
request for a card-check neutrality agreement with the employer was not a 
“present demand for recognition” justifying a management election 
petition.163  
The practical effect of a ruling for the employer in Shaw’s Supermarkets 
and/or Marriot Hartford would be to further eviscerate voluntary 
recognition.  The “public policy” concern recited by the Board proves too 
much and would just as easily justify eliminating voluntary recognition 
altogether.164  This squarely contradicts the NLRA.  As the Supreme Court 
stated in Gissel, “the 1947 amendments did not restrict an employer’s duty 
to bargain under section 8(a)(5) solely to those unions whose representative 
status is certified after a Board election.”165 
4. Formalist Assumptions Within Electoral Doctrine 
In addition to severely limiting the ways in which a bargaining 
relationship can form outside the electoral process, the Board has also 
embraced an increasingly formalistic vision of the electoral process itself.  
If the Board electoral process was relatively realist in its methods, one could 
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perhaps understand the assault on voluntary recognition as standard fare 
efforts by an agency to aggrandize its own power.  However, the assault 
upon voluntary recognition has been coupled with an assault upon realism 
within the Board electoral process itself. 
a) The Unfortunate Language of “Laboratory Conditions” 
The Board has established “laboratory conditions” as the prerequisite for 
a fair voting environment.166  This language implies an absolutist, rather 
than relational, vision of free choice.167  Laboratory conditions create a 
vision of sterilized perfection, of an ideal control circumstance in which 
absolutely pure free choice is isolated from the surrounding dross.168  This 
perspective necessarily implies electoral formalism by reifying a particular 
process and circumstance as the ideal, perfectly free, election proceeding.  
The language of laboratory conditions also suggests that the Board 
believes its electoral method to be neutral and prepolitical, eliminating the 
policy-driven bias that other methods might create.169  The Board does not 
have any proof that its chosen electoral method does, in fact, create those 
laboratory conditions.170  However, as electoral formalists, the Board does 
not feel the need to show that its process “works” in any outcome- or fact-
based way.  Recently, the Board has used the language of laboratory 
conditions as a justification for its moves against voluntary recognition.171 
Ironically, the standard of laboratory conditions was originally created to 
protect, rather than hinder, employee free choice.172  The language was, in 
no small part, an effort by the Board to assert its legitimacy in the aftermath 
of Taft-Hartley.173  However, despite the Board’s best intentions, the rules 
developed under the laboratory conditions standard became increasingly 
formalistic and decreasingly protective of employee free choice under 
intense judicial scrutiny.  As a result, what remains of the once potentially 
powerful standard of laboratory conditions is the electoral formalist 
rhetoric. 
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b) The Decay of the Laboratory Conditions Standard 
The modern laboratory conditions standard has been criticized as too 
permissive of coercive employer activities.174  For example, free speech 
rights allow employers to intimidate and misinform the employees to vote 
against the union.175  Employers are able to have captive audience meetings 
in which they express their antiunion opinions.176  Studies have shown that 
these legal tactics have a significant effect on the employee’s ultimate 
choice.177 
In addition to the specific acts available to the employers within 
laboratory conditions, employers also benefit from their social and 
economic advantage over employees.  The Supreme Court in Gissel 
recognized this problem, but subsequent efforts to solve the problem have 
proven ineffectual.178  For example, in the simple act of picking up a 
paycheck, the employee is reminded that the employee is beholden to the 
employer, and the employer will always have the power to take away the 
employee’s livelihood if the employer chooses.179  Indeed, the law states 
that while an employer’s threats to shut down the business are coercive, the 
act of shutting down the plant in retaliation for union activity is perfectly 
legal.180  Though employees may not know the intricacies of the law, the 
employer’s total control of the workplace is a felt experience.181 
c) The Ineffectiveness of Remedies 
The Board’s penalties for employer violations of the NLRA are 
functionally irrelevant to those employers.  The small fines and rare 
bargaining orders, issued far into the future, pale in comparison to the 
employer’s desire to prevent the establishment of a union in the 
workplace.182  The only remedy for a violation of laboratory conditions 
(short of a ULP) is a rerun of the election procedure.183  Even if ULPs have 
been committed, bargaining orders are rare and the usual remedy is a rerun 
election.184  ULP remedies are also very weak.  For example, the usual 
remedy for discriminatory discharge is reinstatement and back pay (minus 
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mitigation), often many years after the discrimination occurred.185  Unlike 
discrimination under Title VII, no punitive remedies are available for union 
discrimination.186  This feature of the Board policy is, unfortunately, 
severely limited by the language of the NLRA itself.187  Extensive academic 
criticism of NLRA remedies renders further discussion of this issue 
superfluous.188 
d) Formalism in Action 
As an electoral formalist body, the Board declines to analyze facts 
indicating that the electoral method is not the optimal process for enacting 
the free choice of the employees.  When comparing elections to the card-
check process, the Board does not consider which method more often 
results in the precampaign choice of the employees.189  In addition, the 
Board does not evaluate whether the actual situational outcome of a 
unionized versus a nonunionized workplace would indicate whether an 
employee would be more likely to vote for a union.  One might expect that 
the worker’s free choice would, in most instances, be to vote for the 
situation that will best benefit that worker,190 but the Board never analyzes 
whether the initial showing of cards or the election results actually indicate 
the free will of the employees. 
Most surprisingly, the Board does not analyze the differences between 
their model of electoral process—the American system of voting—and their 
own method of electoral process.191  The American system ensures that both 
parties have a high degree of access to the voters.  But in Board elections, 
unions are not allowed access to company property, while the employers are 
allowed to have mandatory meetings regarding their opinions on the 
union.192  In American elections, the ruling party is not able to take away a 
voter’s livelihood if he or she expresses support for the opposition.  But 
under the Board system, workers are often fired illegally for their union 
support, and reinstatement is often long delayed and ineffectual in 
preventing coercive impact on other workers.193  By designing its electoral 
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process to be formally similar, but not too similar, to the American system 
of voting, the Board and courts are able to appear neutral and democratic 
while imposing their own policy-driven desires on the process. 
B. Management Method 
Management interests have adopted strict electoral formalism in 
analyzing the card-check system.  Management advocates express the belief 
that the Board election is the only way to ensure that employees’ free will 
can be protected, and they argue that card-check contracts are inherently 
coercive and thus inadequate as a method for determining a union’s 
majority status.194  The electoral formalist method has support in the NLRA 
and Board precedent.  Under the current law, cards are only due voluntary 
recognition while successful elections require mandatory recognition, 
indicating that the NLRA has, at least, a preference for elections.195  
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments is also 
supportive of this electoral formalist position.196 
Management advocates have adopted several inherently contradictory 
arguments to justify their adherence to electoral formalism.  When 
criticizing card-check agreements, management advocates undertake a 
factual analysis of the potential hazards to employee free choice under this 
contractual system.  Rather than recognize the card-check agreements as 
valid contracts signed by competent adults—the same type of contract that 
businesses use every day—the management advocates focus on the 
potential for coercion in the signing of the cards197 and express their belief 
that this coercion is sufficient to invalidate the cards as an expression of the 
employees’ free choice.198  Indeed, some of the main card-check detractors 
have used this potential for coercion to argue that “all [card-check 
agreements] are fraught with coercion” and should be invalidated as a 
method of organization without any factual analysis of the circumstances 
surrounding each card-check agreement.199  
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When extolling the virtues of the Board elections, the management 
advocates use strong electoral formalism, relying on statements of the 
inherent worth of elections rather than using any factual analysis of the 
actual circumstances surrounding those elections.  In a striking and 
unintentionally ironic mixed metaphor, many anti-card-check advocates 
have even referred to the Board’s elections as the “crown jewel” of 
industrial democracy.200  These advocates focus on two main aspects of the 
Board elections as central to their superiority: the privacy of secret-ballot 
elections201 and, to a much lesser degree, the information provided to the 
employees by the two competing parties.202  Thus, this form of electoral 
formalism requires only two things—secrecy in the voting booth and two 
parties on the ballot—to validate the process of the election.  It does not 
undertake even a cursory analysis of the many other factors that will also 
influence the voter’s expression of choice.  In addition, these management 
advocates play on their audiences’ emotional connection between the 
formal electoral process and patriotism, decrying the card-check advocates 
as “Orwellian.”203  
Management advocates also cite the Board’s repeated use of phrases such 
as “laboratory conditions”204 to support electoral formalism.205  The 
management advocates do not undertake any analysis of whether the 
laboratory conditions are actually present in any given election; instead, 
they rhetorically assume that because the Board says the laboratory 
conditions exist and are effective, they are sufficient for effectuating 
employee free choice.  However, as we have already discussed, the 
protections of these laboratory conditions have eroded throughout the 
Board’s history, and the current standard for laboratory conditions is sadly 
insufficient to protect employees from coercion.206  Indeed, much of the 
language that management advocates use to support their position was 
originally written decades ago to ensure freedom from coercive 
management influence in the electoral process rather than freedom of 
management to participate in the electoral process.207  Management 
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advocates are using the Board’s rhetoric of laboratory conditions while 
taking advantage of the Board’s lax enforcement to perpetuate 
management’s coercion of employees during the electoral process.208 
In their eagerness to disparage the card-check method of union 
recognition, management advocates are willing to cast doubt on the 
employers’ ability to voluntarily enter into card-check neutrality agreements 
with unions.209  These advocates argue that, like the employees, companies 
are unable to enter into noncoercive contractual agreements with unions.  
Instead, they argue that card-check agreements are entered into under duress 
and should be voided.210  They do not recognize these agreements as regular 
contracts with sophisticated participants; instead, they advocate for a factual 
analysis of all the circumstances surrounding the signing of the 
agreement.211  
Skepticism of the validity of contractual agreements is reflective  of 
management advocates’ general electoral formalism in the union context.  
However, the business community’s concern for the contractual method’s 
lack of protection for free will is belied by regular business practices.  Many 
businesses rely on the validity of adhesion contracts formed under 
conditions very similar to those under which employees signed union 
cards.212  Adhesion contracts are not signed secretly; the contracts are often 
not explained in detail to the customer; and the customer is bound by their 
decision regardless of a later change of heart.  In the card-check context, the 
employee signs the card publicly, may not be fully aware of all the 
implications of signing the card, and will be bound to the representation of 
the union if the union gains the requisite number of cards.  However, 
businesses argue that the adhesion contract can be a permissible and 
suitable method for making an agreement while they decry the similar use 
of union cards as coercive and invalid.213  
In addition, a contract made between an employee and a company will 
also be tainted with coercion—the company has the power, the money, and 
the job, and the employee can only bargain with his or her (easily 
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replaceable) manpower214—but the business community will certainly not 
contest the employee’s ability to make a binding agreement in that 
circumstance.  Indeed, while management advocates actually argue that the 
employee/employer agreement is less coercive than the employee/union 
agreement,215 current employment law provides few safeguards to protect 
the employee’s interests in the at-will employment context.216  While the 
employer community’s anti-card-check arguments are mainly from the 
perspective of protecting worker freedom, the alternative to unionism—at-
will employment—is hardly a proworker scheme. 
Furthermore, an employee is often not aware of all the rights the 
employee is relinquishing when he or she signs an employment agreement 
with an employer, such as a binding arbitration commitment.217  Although 
management advocates argue that employees are not aware of what they are 
committing to when they sign a union card, they are more than willing to 
hold an employee to an arbitration agreement that was not explained to the 
employee when he or she signed it.218 
These inconsistencies highlight the management advocates’ instrumental 
use of the electoral formalism argument—while management’s arguments 
may sound sincere, they do not practice what they preach.  The business 
community insists on a functional and factual (and ultimately impossible) 
analysis for proof that the contractual method of union recognition is not 
coercive, yet the community relies on a formalist contractual method in its 
everyday business practices.  By rejecting contract formalism in the union 
context, the business community actually casts doubt on its reliance on 
contract formalism in nearly every other area of business law.219 
C. Union Methods 
Unions are also inconsistent in their evaluation of free choice in the union 
selection processes.  Union advocates use a type of contract formalism to 
evaluate employee free choice under card check.220  However, when 
evaluating and critiquing the Board election process, unions have adopted a 
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realist approach.  Despite this inconsistency, the union’s mixed method for 
evaluating the will of the employees has significant support in court and 
Board decisions. 
1. Contract Formalism in the Card-Check Context 
Though union supporters rarely use the language of freedom of contract, 
the validity of signed cards as an indicator of employee intent necessarily 
assumes a baseline contractual perspective.  In Dana/Metaldyne, card-check 
supporters were in a defensive position—primarily rebutting the anti-card-
check advocates’ electoral formalism—and positive statements of the 
unions’ underlying rationale supporting card check as an indicator of intent 
were rare.  However, some card-check advocates do suggest that the card-
check method is a per se indication of the employees’ free choice.221  In the 
legislative debates, card-check supporters are in the offensive position and 
are expected to more clearly articulate affirmative reasons why signed cards 
accurately represent employee free will.  For example, in her testimony to 
the Senate on the EFCA, law professor Cynthia Estlund indicated that cards 
should be presumptively valid absent any showing of explicit union 
coercion.222  
Arguments by management that point to the possibility that union 
organizers may obtain signatures from uninformed, naïve, or socially 
pressured employees are unrecognizable to a contract formalist because the 
contract formalist presumes that people read and understand agreements 
that they sign.223  Under contract formalism, a failure to read or understand 
an agreement before signing is the signer’s fault, and any detriment that 
occurs from that omission is fair and lawful.224  In addition, the inability of 
management under a neutrality agreement (a common addition to the card-
check agreement) to explain its side of the union/management debate is 
irrelevant to whether the employees are making a free choice.  No baseline 
amount of information is required for contractually recognizable consent 
because employees who are legally capable of entering an agreement are 
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presumed to be able to obtain all the information they need to make a free 
choice.225 
Substantial support for the union’s contract formalism method can be 
found in the NLRA.  The NLRA permits union certification by voluntary 
recognition, and the Board and the courts have a long history of interpreting 
it to allow, and even encourage, voluntary recognition via card check.226  In 
addition, the NLRA does not mandate that the electoral process is the only 
means by which majority support may be determined.  Instead, it implicitly 
permits any of the traditional contractual methods of demonstrating the will 
of the employees.227  By indicating that these other “suitable” methods for 
determining majority support exist, the NLRA tacitly validates the 
voluntary recognition method, which is founded on basic freedom-of-
contract methods of determining the employee’s will and the absence of 
unacceptable coercion. 
Contract formalism can also be found in the NLRA in its evaluation of 
acceptable and unacceptable coercion by establishing the ways in which 
both employers and unions can violate the NLRA through coercive 
activities.228  In the card-check context, the most important of these 
provisions is section 7, which, among other things, protects the right of 
employees to refrain from participating in collective activities such as 
joining a union.229  If the union “restrain[s] or coerce[s]” employees in the 
exercise of section 7 rights by applying overly powerful pressure on 
employees to sign a card, the union has committed a ULP, and the card 
would not be valid under section 8(b)(1).230  This vague standard appears, at 
least by its language, to invoke contract formalism and its definitions of 
duress.  The NLRA’s banning of certain types of coercion is similar to 
contract law’s invalidation of contracts that are signed under certain 
situations, such as duress or incapacity, while not invalidating contracts 
signed in other types of potentially coercive situations, such as extreme 
poverty or lack of education.  In this way, the NLRA merely redefines 
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duress but otherwise embraces the general structure of contract 
formalism.231 
Thus, the union’s methodology for examining the worker’s free choice in 
card-check agreements is a modified contract formalism, with unacceptable 
coercion defined in part by the NLRA.  The union process does not go into 
a realist analysis of the card-check procedure.232  This lack of a realist 
analysis may be the result of the union’s interest in the card-check 
procedure, as card-check recognition more often results in a showing of 
majority support.233  The unions may also rely on the formalist analysis here 
because formalism can be explained in absolutist terms, in a way that seems 
neutral and fair to the average citizen.  Thus, the formalist evaluation of 
card check provides the unions with the best of both worlds: they reach the 
desired outcome without appearing self-serving and arousing political 
suspicion. 
Unions have also taken advantage of this modified contract formalism to 
criticize the election process.234  By expanding the definition of duress to 
include the NLRA’s language under sections 7–8, unions are able to 
characterize elections that occur after employer ULPs as less free than a 
card-check (contractual) situation.235  Unions are thus able to invert the 
typical hierarchy of protectivity within formal methods.  
2. Realism in the Election Context 
In evaluating elections, unions often take the critique of elections further 
than is consistent with contract formalism even as modified by the 
NLRA.236  In attempting to demonstrate the necessity of permitting card 
check, unions have adopted a realist critique of elections that goes far 
deeper than is consistent with the contract formalism used to evaluate card 
check.  In this sense, the unions are using a double standard of applying 
contract formalism to card check while using functional criticisms of the 
electoral process.237  While statistics demonstrating that massive ULPs are a 
characteristic aspect of most elections could be interpreted as consistent 
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with modified contract formalism, arguments that these ULPs are more 
likely to influence workers because of their functionally subservient 
position in the employer/employee relationship indicate the introduction of 
realist analytical methods.238  
Thus, the unions’ mixed method for deciding which processes are 
democratic illustrates their ad hoc reasoning.  Because unions currently are 
more successful with card check, they adopt the methodology most 
supportive of card check in the card-check arguments.  When discussing the 
problems of Board elections, however, they switch their tactics to the 
functional critique of on-the-ground problems with the electoral process.  
Despite this inconsistency, the unions’ mixed method for evaluating the 
will of the employees has significant support in court and Board decisions.  
The Board and the courts have been willing to employ a realist analysis of 
the electoral process to set aside the results.239  When an employer has 
committed massive ULPs in its attempts to discourage employees from 
voting for the union, the Board ignores the formal showing of no majority 
support and will either order a new election or, occasionally, order the 
employer to bargain with the union.240  Conversely, the Board will 
sometimes rely on a formalist trust in the results of card-check recognition 
to actually order an employer to bargain on the basis of a preelection 
contractual showing of majority support.241  Thus, while it is intellectually 
inconsistent, the unions’ mixed use of the functional and formal methods of 
evaluation has been traditionally utilized by the Board and by courts to 
determine the will of the employees. 
IV. THE REALIST CRITIQUE OF FREE CHOICE IN THE WORKPLACE 
Union and management advocates both identify serious problems with 
the Board process.  Any sincere effort to ensure free employee choice must 
account for these problems.  Rather than attempting to deal with these 
issues, the current Board has obscured them with formalism, abandoning 
the mandate of the NLRA to protect worker free choice.  
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Management advocates have argued persuasively that the card-check 
process inadequately protects the free choice of employees.242  This 
argument is particularly persuasive in the case of employees with little 
education, lacking a sophisticated understanding of the legal and practical 
implications of the prounion or antiunion choice.  These employees are 
likely unable to make a decision based on anything more reliable than 
rumor, ideology, or the baldly partisan assertions of union and management 
advocates.  The Board does not carefully police the truthfulness of the 
unions’ assertions during the representation campaigns, and employees 
often have a difficult time finding neutral information about the pros and 
cons of union representation.243  The management criticisms recognize this 
inequity and are substantiated by a well-developed body of research and 
case law suggesting that, in the traditional contractual situation, adhesion 
contracts between parties with disparate bargaining power are rarely freely 
and fairly chosen.244 
The unions have persuasively criticized the electoral process because it 
permits employers to wage a coercive campaign against union 
organization.245  The unions’ most convincing arguments focus on the 
employer’s complete control of employees’ well-being.  Under an at-will 
employment system, when the Board is protecting core entrepreneurial 
prerogatives—for example, the right to go completely out of business even 
for retaliatory reasons—employees are well aware that employers entirely 
control their livelihoods.246  Paychecks, health insurance, and business 
connections are all within the control of the employer.247  Under these 
circumstances, even calmly stated expressions of preference against the 
union carry the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. 
In addition, though it is rarely mentioned by unions, the employer also 
plays a role in crafting the ideology and, thus, the self-perception of the 
worker.248  In modern society, employers are among the most powerful of 
the institutions responsible for creating and perpetuating social ideology.  A 
worker’s supervisors subject him or her to the ideology by their very 
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existence, informing the worker that he or she is subordinate to the 
employer and less qualified than the employer to direct his or her own 
labor.  Indeed, the micromanaging, condescension, arbitrary decisions, and 
pervasive control of the employer wield great power upon the self- 
perception of the worker.249  Employers treat employees as subjects, driving 
an ideological wedge between the worker and her labor, which is controlled 
by, and thus a part of, the employer. Employees then believe that their labor 
is not their own but that it has been validly purchased by the employers and 
is thus completely subject to the employers’ control.250  In this situation, an 
employee will not feel entitled to claim his or her right to join a union and 
thus exercise some power over his or her own labor.  In addition, other 
social structures, such as the tiered educational system, function to reinforce 
the worker’s belief that he or she is unqualified to make decisions regarding 
the nature of and compensation for his or her own work.251  Against this 
ideological backdrop, the worker is, without any basis in fact, predisposed 
to think that the union could not be effective because the employer requires, 
and has a right to, total and arbitrary control to manage effectively.  The 
ideology of the employer interpellates the employees’ identity, saying that 
workers should not collaborate to take more control of directing their work 
because they are just workers—it’s not their job; it’s none of their 
business.252  
In these criticisms, both explicit and implicit, the Board has clearly 
abandoned its mandate to protect worker free choice.253  As summarized 
above, Board doctrine relies increasingly on unadulterated electoral 
formalism, looking only to the reified, politically contingent concept of 
laboratory conditions.254  The text and purpose of the Wagner Act clearly 
demand a thoroughgoing realist approach to ensuring worker free choice.255  
The Wagner Act is adamant that employees should be free to choose the 
representative whom they desire.256  The Taft-Hartley amendments inserted 
protections for individual employee rights to decline to participate in 
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collective action;257 however, the Taft-Hartley amendments did not remove 
the important language of the Wagner Act’s purpose.  
The Wagner Act and its authors suggest that “true freedom of contract” is 
only possible within a unionized workplace.258  If true freedom of contract 
is an objective of the statute, and true freedom is only possible with 
collective representation, then protection of rights not to bargain 
collectively makes little sense.  The bizarre result is that the modern NLRA 
does not protect freedom, but the “freedom to choose” whether to be free or 
not.  In addition, the Taft-Hartley amendments did not alter the Wagner 
Act’s protection of voluntary recognition.259  Instead of replacing voluntary 
recognition with electoral formalism, the Taft-Hartley amendments simply 
distorted the purpose of the Wagner Act—to ensure that workers can choose 
freely to bargain collectively—without replacing it with a coherent purpose.  
In light of this legislative confusion, it is perhaps understandable that the 
current Board has lost sight of the importance of ensuring that employee 
choices in the workplace are, in fact, free. 
Rather than pursue a realist goal of ensuring that all employees can make 
their pro or antiunion choice in a free context, the Board relies on an 
electoral formalist concept of laboratory conditions.  This concept has no 
ontological significance and is politically contingent.  The circumstances in 
which a choice is made always have a substantially significant impact on 
the outcome; even the process of being observed in making one’s choice 
will impact the choice itself.260  At the same time, it is impossible to 
conceive of choice in a total vacuum; at least some circumstances and 
surrounding context are necessary to give a meaning to the choice.261  
Any definition of laboratory conditions must include some aspects of the 
circumstances to give the choice meaning.262  However, the precedent 
reveals no principled basis to distinguish between improper influences that 
disturb laboratory conditions and other circumstances that are acceptable to 
consider and which give the choice meaning.263  This is not caused by a 
failure to discover and apply the correct principles; laboratory conditions do 
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not isolate the true desires of the employees because the concept has no 
prepolitical significance.  Studies that try to isolate aspects of electoral 
circumstances and their influence on worker choice fail to answer the 
question of whether the circumstances are coercive or not because it is 
impossible to know what a choice made in a vacuum would look like.264 
Therefore, there is no principled way to determine what kinds of 
circumstantial influences on the employees’ choices are acceptable or 
required and what kinds are not.  Because of this lack of principled 
methodology, the way laboratory conditions are described—what is within 
laboratory conditions and what is not within laboratory conditions—is a 
political choice.  Without a principled grounding, the Board’s laboratory 
conditions electoral formalism falls apart and becomes a baldly political or 
policy-driven choice.265 
Both union and management critiques suggest that circumstances in 
society guarantee that neither card-check nor electoral methods of 
determining the free choice of the employees will be adequate.  These 
critiques prove too much against the Board process; a more radical overhaul 
is necessary to ensure employee free choice.  If, as employer advocates 
assert, lack of education and inability to understand the impact of 
labor/management choices leave employees susceptible to coercion by 
union advocates in the card-check context, these factors do not disappear or 
lose importance simply because the choice is made on a ballot.  Speech 
during an electoral campaign by union and management is hardly 
educational or nonmisleading.266  
If, as union advocates have argued, the immense power of the employer 
to dictate the conditions of employment makes the electoral process 
inherently coercive, then card check can also not be expected to completely 
counterbalance this power.  Card check still permits employers to exercise 
their coercive power over employees before the decision can be made, 
providing an analytical framework to employees that protects the 
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employers’ interests.  If both of these criticisms are true, neither system is 
adequate to protect employees.  
These critiques point out problems within general society that make the 
current system not conducive to free choice.  Any choice made within an at-
will employment system, including those made via the card-check method, 
will have the problems identified by the union.  Employees are subject to 
the employer’s ideology prior to choosing whether to sign a card.  
Employees are also always subject to the ultimate employer retaliation: 
going out of business.  No amount of tweaking the process to shield 
employees from potentially coercive speech can change the role that 
employers play in interpellating employees as subjects, constantly 
reaffirming the basic fact that the employer and his or her capital control the 
employees’ well-being.267  
An appropriate analogy is to political elections in totalitarian nations.268  
Within a totalitarian nation, a vote for the ruling party can hardly be 
considered a free choice.  When a single party has extreme control over all 
aspects of citizens’ lives, a person runs a terrible risk by voting against that 
party.  Even assuming a particular voter has the extraordinary strength of 
will to withstand the propaganda and ideology formation created by the 
totalitarian state, it is incredibly risky and most likely irrational to vote 
against the ruling party.  The at-will employer exercises an even greater 
degree of control over the economic livelihood of the employee than the 
totalitarian exercises over the life of the voter.269  Thus, the issue cannot be 
addressed adequately by simply tinkering with the system if the underlying 
system stands undisturbed.  By definition, there is no free choice within an 
unfree society.  An unfree person cannot freely choose whether to be free.  
Only a process that effectively accounts for these underlying inequities will 
allow free choice.  This accounting is what the authors of the Wagner Act 
were trying to do when they discussed “actual liberty of contract.”270  
While labor law cannot fix these underlying social problems, it can 
account for them in the creation of unionized workplaces.  This requires 
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changing the position of employees in the workplace to ensure that true 
democratic choice will be possible.  Labor law should permit employees to 
make choices about how to exercise the collective power of the workers, 
rather than merely permitting employees to choose whether to join together 
to realize their power. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Labor law cannot completely fix the problems of social ideology and 
background oppression.  However, labor law can alleviate, or at least refrain 
from exacerbating, the more damaging forms of coercion.  Ultimately, no 
labor law process will be able to isolate free choice, but there are many 
steps that can be taken that would improve the situation and limit the effect 
of the most coercive factors. 
As a first step, the NLRB should overturn Dana/Metaldyne and other 
recent cases that restrict the unions’ ability to utilize card-check agreements.  
These decisions further entrench electoral formalism, obscuring rather than 
illuminating and alleviating coercion.  While the card-check process does 
not eliminate the coercive effect of employer ideology, card-check 
agreements signal to employees that, because the union is powerful enough 
to obtain a card-check agreement from the employer, the union may be 
strong enough to protect them from the most terrifying forms of retaliation, 
freeing them to consider whether to exercise their collective power to take 
some control of their own labor. 
Second, the Board should monitor union actions during card-check 
campaigns to ensure that the union is not providing false information to the 
employees.  In the election context, the Board should return to its policy of 
realistically assessing the coercive impact of employers’ and unions’ 
statements.  These minor adjustments would partially rectify the 
information gap faced by many employees when they are deciding whether 
to vote for the union. 
864 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE 
Third, Congress would further the ability of the employees to make a free 
choice if it passed legislation such as the EFCA.  Although management 
advocates have articulated problems with the process proposed by the 
EFCA, it is still superior to the current Board electoral system in protecting 
free choice.  The threat of employer retaliation remains a most potent form 
of coercion, and legislation could limit the ability of employers to make 
these threats by eliminating the campaign.  In some ways, the mandatory 
recognition card-check process proposed by legislation is weaker than the 
card-check agreements obtained under the current method because card 
check under the EFCA would not signal to employees that the employer 
would not retaliate against them.  However, the card-check process as 
proposed by the EFCA would require fewer resources and would proceed 
much more quickly than card-check agreements (which often require an 
extended corporate campaign to prove the union’s strength), thereby 
permitting a greater number of employees to express their preference.  In 
addition to ensuring that employees have more opportunities to express 
their choice for a union beyond the watchful eye of the employer, the EFCA 
would also provide an interest arbitration clause, which will ensure that the 
employees’ choice to be represented by a union will ultimately be 
effectuated by a collective bargaining agreement, at least for the first few 
years. 
Alternatively, as a more modest reform, Congress could revert section 
9(c) back to its original form under the Wagner Act, emphasizing that 
Board certification can be based on any kind of proof of majority support.  
Certification should issue the moment a majority representative is proven 
by a preponderance of the evidence, regardless of the form of the evidence.  
This reform is more elegant than the parallel portions of the EFCA because 
it more effectively eliminates formalist fictions.  Majority support would 
again be a simple matter of fact, for which any probative evidence would be 
admissible.  The historical circumstances that plagued the Board in its first 
twelve years have since passed, and the Board is currently in a far better 
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position to make these determinations without invoking suspicions of 
communist or anti-AFL sentiment. 
However, these relatively modest steps are only the beginning of the 
effort to fully effectuate employee free choice.  They do not adequately 
address the underlying issues of employer domination by ideology and total 
control of livelihood.  While a full explication of the reforms needed is 
beyond the scope of this article, the following basic outline will guide future 
efforts and provoke reformers to ask the right questions.271 
In order to address the coercive impact of the employer’s total control of 
the work, the system of at-will termination and “core managerial 
prerogatives” must be replaced by another legal regime that permits 
employees to recognize the validity of their collective power.  Currently, 
total employer control is a baseline interest that the employer may 
contractually waive.  A less coercive system would provide employees a 
baseline interest in their jobs that they could contractually waive.  The 
employer would then have to negotiate with the employee for the right to 
fire them for just cause.  At-will adhesion agreements between dramatically 
unequal parties would be considered unconscionable as a matter of law.  
This alteration would eliminate a significant source of employer power over 
the employees, freeing them from the fear of arbitrary firing and providing 
the minimal level of job security necessary to confidently assert collective 
rights against the employer.  The increased success of second (as compared 
to first) contract negotiations in the union context is at least partly 
attributable to the protection provided by just cause provisions in the first 
contract. 
Instead of a baseline of no union, with employees required to take a 
number of onerous steps to be democratically represented, the baseline 
should be a democratic decision-making scheme in every workplace, with 
the option of affiliating with an international union if the employees so 
choose.272  Imperfect international comparators abound, particularly in 
Germany and Japan.273  In some industries, where employees are in high 
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demand, employees may generally favor individual bargaining for issues 
such as salary.  If a majority of employees wish to bargain individually on 
particular terms, they would simply specify that proviso in the unit contract, 
which occurs currently in the professional sports unions.  This baseline 
shift, in addition to lessening the employer’s power over the employees, 
would provide support for a different ideology in which workers have the 
right to manage and organize their own labor. 
While none of these proposals will fully rectify the issues we have 
identified in the union certification scheme, they would provide a starting 
point for ensuring that employee free choice is effectuated by American 
labor law. 
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upcoming sessions.  See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, A 
Majority of Senators Stand Up for Working Families (June 26, 2007), available at 
http://kennedy.senate.gov/newsroom/press_release.cfm?id=e20ab81b-4fc7-4a7e-9441-
ef9efb69f82f. 
6 Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28, at 1. 
7 See infra Part III.A.2.  In accepting review of another recognition case, the Board went 
even further, explicitly asking (in the context of a card-check neutrality agreement 
applying to “after-acquired” facilities) “whether public policy reasons outweigh the 
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Employer’s private agreement not to have an election.”  Shaw’s Supermarkets, 343 
N.L.R.B. 963, 963 (2004). 
8 The Employee Free Choice Act: Restoring Economic Opportunity for Working 
Families: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 
110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Professor Cynthia Estlund, 
Professor of Law, New York University Law School), available at 
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_03_27_a/2007_03_27_a.html (stating that NLRB 
elections are but a “trapping of democracy” and “a parody of democracy”); see also 
Hearings, supra (statement of Peter Hurtgen, former chair of the NLRB) (“It seems to 
me, frankly, self-evident that full freedom can only be achieved . . . by a secret ballot in 
choosing a representative.”).  
9 Although the NLRB is, in many senses, functioning as an expert agency with wide 
discretion for policymaking delegated to it by Congress in the NLRA, it is constrained to 
some extent by the existing statutory language and history, and the prospect of appellate 
court review.  Congress, on the other hand, is free to remake policy choices as it sees fit.  
Nonetheless, in the current context, these differences are unimportant because the 
legislature has chosen to focus upon “employee free choice” as the primary value to be 
served by representation proceedings while the Board has similarly interpreted employee 
free choice as a primary objective of the current law.  In theory, the Board is also 
constrained by the weight of its own precedent to maintain a certain level of stability in 
industrial relations.  In recent years, this constraint has proved more and more illusory.  
See infra Part III.A.2–3. 
10 This primary question—how to evaluate the role of free choice in a process—is 
closely related to a number of other issues.  For example, what does “free choice” or 
“free will” look like?  If the purpose of a procedure is to determine the will of the 
majority of employees, how can the process ensure that the choices made by the 
employees are free? 
11 The rhetoric of both sides, particularly in the Congressional debate over the EFCA, is 
often couched in terms of workplace democracy.  See infra Part III.B, C. 
12 See infra Part I. 
13 See infra Part IV. 
14 Compare Dana Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1283, 1283 (2004) (“The issue raised herein is the 
extent to which, if any, a voluntary recognition should be given an election ‘bar 
quality.’”) with id. at 1287 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting) (“The Petitioners 
also argue that employees may be ‘coerced’ into signing authorization cards. . . . [T]he 
Act provides recourse for employees who believe their employer recognized a union that 
lacked uncoerced majority support.”). 
15 The majority in Dana/Metaldyne most likely believes, like former NLRB Chair 
Hurtgen, that it is “self evident” that elections better protect freedom of choice.  See 
supra note 8.  However, if freedom of choice is assessed realistically, secret ballots in 
laboratory conditions may not be adequate to protect free choice.  See infra Part III.A.4. 
16 Formalism and realism, as discussed in this article, should not be confused with the 
historical movements for which they are named.  These historical movements provide a 
greater context for understanding the terms but are not identical to the ways in which we 
use them in this article. 
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17 Formalism is akin to the “grid aesthetic” described by Pierre Schlagg in The Aesthetics 
of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1061 (2002) (“Both the appellate judge and 
the academic can become entranced with maintaining or perfecting the grid at the 
expense of attending to its worldly implications.  This is the allure of law cast as 
geometry.  This is the formalist orientation par excellence: the dominance of concern 
with maintaining the proper form and order of law in terms of its own criteria.” (citations 
omitted)). 
18 This seemingly simple statement skims lightly over a massive area of controversy in 
jurisprudence.  See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994); RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).  Suffice it to say that many thinkers identify the 
application of bright-line rules as an essential feature distinguishing law from other forms 
of social control. 
19 See, e.g., Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 
(1985) (discussing the use of reified metaphors in creating the appearance of neutrality in 
contract law). 
20 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1710 (1976). 
21 See HENRY A. M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
22 This very brief working description of formalism combines two distinct, and in some 
ways contradictory, ways of thinking about law: classical legal thought and process 
theory.  The confusion is deliberate; both ways of thinking share an emphasis on 
categorization.  Both share the faith that if only a factual situation can be squeezed into 
the right category, the issue will resolve itself in an apolitical fashion.  This belief is the 
basic characteristic that binds this broad grouping of methodology together.  While 
modern process theory is a response to the historical realist movement that is, in many 
ways, sensitive to the concerns of historical realism, it is the categorization approach 
favored by process theory that justifies its treatment under the broad category of 
formalism.  To reiterate, these broad categories are not coextensive with any particular 
historical movements, but they are merely a device for classifying efforts to evaluate 
“free choice.” 
23 The origins of the common law of contracts, at least the pertinent aspects of that 
tradition, have been traced to England’s covenants under seal in the twelfth century and 
the doctrine of assumpsit in the fourteenth century.  See KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY 
OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 2–3 (1990). 
24 The use of the male pronoun in these circumstances is intended to be (ironically) 
historically accurate, as early common law identified women as legally incompetent to 
contract. 
25 The method for demonstrating “acceptance” often varies according to the kind of 
agreement: from seal, to notary, to signature, to verbal declaration.  However, what these 
modes of acceptance have in common is that they are public, unique to the individual 
(unforgeable), and often permanent.  These aspects functioned to impress upon the parties 
the seriousness, irrevocability, and permanence of the obligations created by the contract 
and to ensure easy proof and enforcement of the contract. 
    Fetishizing the Electoral Process  869 
VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 2 • 2008 
 
26 Under common law contract, duress was limited to physical violence or imprisonment.  
See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., Matthew 
Bender 2002) (1951) (“Few areas of the law of contracts have undergone such radical 
changes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as has the law governing duress.  In 
Blackstone’s time (c. 1776), relief from an agreement on grounds of duress was a 
possibility only if the agreement was coerced by actual (not threatened) imprisonment or 
fear of loss of life or limb. . . . Today the general rule is that any wrongful act or threat 
which overcomes the free will of a party constitutes duress.  This simple statement of the 
law, however, conceals a number of questions, particularly as to the meaning of ‘free 
will’ and ‘wrongful.’” (footnotes omitted)).  The definition of “duress” is at the heart of 
our inquiry into employee free choice. 
27 See id. § 27. 
28 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006).  See 
also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 
U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
29 29 U.S.C. § 158(b).  
30 JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 171, 178–
80 (1983) (“Although decisions in labor law are not usually written in status or 
contractual terms, many of the decisions involve the construing or constructing of status 
or contractual relationships. . . . Indeed, the statute is often used to enforce those aspects 
of the contractual relationship that courts create.”). 
31 From its infancy, the card-check process presumed consent from signature.  See infra 
Part II.C. 
32 The American electoral process is not a stable process; instead, it has been molded to 
fit the social circumstances and is a controversial system.  For example, the electoral 
college has inspired much debate, and the continuing lack of federal representation for 
citizens living in the District of Columbia indicates the political nature of the system’s 
tailoring.  See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The 
Creation of the Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 429 (1999) (arguing 
that the electoral college system was designed to enhance the power of the white leaders 
in the slave-holding states); Symposium, Is There a Constitutional Right To Vote and Be 
Represented?: The Case of the District of Columbia, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 589, 617 (1999) 
(remarks by Professor Gary Peller) (“What we have in the District of Columbia is a more 
or less classic case of colonialism, of an old style eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
colonialism.  The biggest mark of that colonialism, the most obvious from our twentieth-
century liberal eyes, is the denial of formal self-determination, denial of the formal right 
to vote.”). 
33 See infra Parts III.A.4, III.B for a description of a current electoral formalist point of 
view. 
34 See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H1980 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2007) (statement of Rep. Wilson) 
(“The so-called card check provision of the bill would force union membership by the 
signing of a form and thus denying employees having secret ballot elections.  As citizens 
of a democratic Nation, Americans have the right to elect their public officials in secrecy 
and without coercion.”); 153 CONG. REC. H2102 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2007) (statement of 
Rep. Foxx) (“I want to talk a little bit and give another side of the story of this bill that 
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passed here today called the Employee Free Choice Act.  We have been calling it the 
Employee Intimidation Act.  And what I find most astonishing is that our colleagues on 
the other side are so willing to knock down one of the cornerstones of our democracy, 
and that is the right to a private ballot.  For centuries, Americans, regardless of race, 
creed or gender, have fought for the right to vote and the right to keep that vote to 
themselves.  Now, just months after a new House majority was elected in 435 separate 
elections, it has just voted to strip men and women of this country of their right to a 
private ballot in the workplace. I don’t know what could be more undemocratic than that.  
Again, it just seems to me that hypocrisy is running rampant among the House 
majority.”). 
35 While this question seems incredibly vague, even to the point of meaninglessness, it is 
important to remember that formal methods are only given content by the historical 
context.  One can imagine a relatively formal, concrete definition of “punish” that gives 
meaning to this test; thus, the actual impact of the test will depend greatly on the 
definition given to this word.  In this sense, our imagined anarchist formalism is neither 
more nor less natural, concrete, administrable, a priori, or definite than contract or 
electoral formalism. 
36 The secret ballot was not added to the American electoral process until the late 
nineteenth century and was fiercely opposed by classical liberals such as John Stuart 
Mill, who argued that, as a “public duty, [voting] should be performed under the eye and 
criticism of the public” rather than in secret.  John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The 
Absentee Ballot and the Secret Ballot: Challenges for Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 483, 487–90 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS 
ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 232–33 (1946)).  Mill argued that public voting 
ensured that voters would act in the public interest, rather than in merely private or selfish 
interest.  Id. 
37 Many votes are still taken by declaration, such as Constitutionally-prescribed roll-call 
voting on legislation in Congress.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I § 7. 
38 For example, politicians are not permitted to create contracts to purchase a vote from a 
voter, and contract law has no explanation of this policy choice.   
39 Some proponents of the law and economics approach advocate an expansion of that 
methodology into most, if not all areas of life.  For example, some well-respected law and 
economics scholars have defended a proposal for a “baby market.”  See, e.g., Richard A. 
Posner, Adoption and Market Theory: The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 
B.U. L. REV. 59, 70 (1987) (arguing that the lawful selling of babies should be less 
regulated to decrease the number of babies being sold illegally or through the black 
market).  The nonbinding character of adoption contracts signed before birth is not only a 
rejection of contract formalism, but is in itself a kind of “anarchist formalism” in which 
no choice is considered free unless it can be revoked at any time before actual 
performance. 
40 For a classic work of realism, see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV  809 (1935). 
41 One important feature of realism is its humility.  Realism does not pretend to discover 
fundamental truths; instead, it tries to find ways to compare options rather than achieve 
ideals. 
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42 For a more expansive explanation of the implementation of realism, see infra Part IV. 
43 In fact, this basic effort is the foundation of the Wagner Act itself.  See To Create a 
National Labor Board: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d 
Cong. 17 (1934) [hereinafter To Create a National Labor Board] (statement of Sen. 
Wagner) (“I think it has been recognized that, due to our industrial growth, it is simply 
absured [sic] to say that an individual, one of 10,000 workers, is on an equality with his 
employer in bargaining for wages.  The worker, if he does not submit to the employers 
terms, faces ruin for his family.  The so-called freedom of contract does not exist under 
such circumstances.  The only way that the worker will be accorded the freedom of 
contract to which, under our theory of government, he is entitled, is by the intrusion of 
the Government to give him that right, by protecting collective bargaining.  When 10,000 
come together and collectively bargain with the employer, then there is equality of 
bargaining power.”), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 31, 47 (1949) [hereinafter 1 LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT]. 
44 See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 472–73 (1923) (“The owner can remove the legal duty under which 
the non-owner labors with respect to the owner’s property.  He can remove it, or keep it 
in force, at his discretion.  To keep it in force may or may not have unpleasant 
consequences to the non-owner—consequences which spring from the law’s creation of 
legal duty.  To avoid these consequences, the non-owner may be willing to obey the will 
of the owner, provided that the obedience is not in itself more unpleasant than the 
consequences to be avoided.  Such obedience may take the . . . form of working for the 
owner at disagreeable toil for a slight wage. . . . [W]hat would be the consequence of 
refusal to comply with the owner’s terms?  It would be either absence of wages, or 
obedience to the terms of some other employer. . . . Suppose, now, the worker were to 
refuse to yield to the coercion of any employer, but were to choose instead to remain 
under the legal duty to abstain from the use of any of the money which anyone owns.  He 
must eat.  While there is no law against eating in the abstract, there is a law which forbids 
him to eat any of the food which actually exists in the community—and that law is the 
law of property. . . . Unless, then, the non-owner can produce his own food, the law 
compels him to starve if he has no wages, and compels him to go without wages unless 
he obeys the behests of some employer.”). 
45 CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC 
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 21 (2005).  During the first half of the eighteen 
hundreds, state governments fought labor organization through criminal conspiracy law, 
often convicting defendants for their participation in labor “combinations.”  See generally 
CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 128–79 (1993) (analyzing law and politics in the United States between 1790 
and 1850, focusing on the interaction between law and labor and examining the social 
and political reasons for the dominant role of legal discourse during this time period); 
IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 1933-
1941 (1970) (examining the rising power of unions, the influential role of labor in politics 
under the New Deal, and the reorienting of public policy from employers to workers). 
46 Railway Labor Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2006). 
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47 MORRIS, supra note 45, at 21–22.  When introducing an amendment to the NIRA, 
Senator Wagner indicated that the NIRA was defective because, unlike the RLA, it did 
not guarantee employees the right to recognition.  This deficiency led to “over 70 percent 
of the disputes coming before the [NLB, which had] been caused by the refusal of 
employers to deal with representatives chosen by their workers.”  Instead, the amendment 
was “modeled upon the successful experience of the Railway Labor Act, which provides 
that employers shall actually recognize duly chosen representatives and make a 
reasonable effort to deal with them and to reach satisfactory collective agreements.”  78 
CONG. REC. 3443, 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. 
WAGNER ACT, supra note 43, at 15, 16–17. 
48 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152; see also the discussion of section 2(9) of RLA 
infra Part II.B.  Interestingly, the National Mediation Board, which supervises elections 
under the RLA, currently uses mail-in ballots or telephone voting with an anonymous 
identification number rather than in-person voting as the NLRB does.  See Nat’l 
Mediation Bd., Representation Manual (Sept. 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.nmb.gov/representation/representation-manual.pdf. 
49 See MORRIS, supra note 45, at 22; BERNSTEIN, supra note 45, at 174. 
50 National Industrial Recovery Act, Ch. 90, § 7(a)(1)–(2), 48 Stat. 195 (1933) 
(invalidated in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). 
51 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 19 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  See DAVID BRODY, LABOR 
EMBATTLED: HISTORY, POWER, RIGHTS 49 (2005).  The Norris-LaGuardia Act’s full 
declaration of the United States’ public policy is even more striking: “Whereas under 
prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for 
owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, 
the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of 
contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and 
conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate 
with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the 
terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, 
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such 
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”  Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2. 
52 BRODY, supra note 51, at 101. 
53 Id.  
54 See id. at 49–50; MORRIS, supra note 45, at 31.  See also Hearings on S. 1958 Before 
the Sen. Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong. 40 (1935) (statement of Sen. 
Wagner) (stating that over 69 percent of the company unions existing in 1935 began after 
the NIRA was passed), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT, supra note 43, at 1377, 
1416. 
55 BRODY, supra note 51, at 102. 
56 See id. at 101–02.  For a discussion of parallel development of formal electoral 
methods to resolve interunion disputes in the 1940s, see discussion infra Part II.C. 
57 MORRIS, supra note 45, at 34. 
58 Id. at 31–32. 
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59 Id. at 32. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. 
62 Id. at 34 (citation omitted).  The Executive Order 6580 was signed in February 1934.  
President Roosevelt had already signed Executive Order 6511 in December 1933, which 
approved the Board’s prior actions and authorized the Board to “settle by mediation, 
conciliation or arbitration all controversies between employers and employees which tend 
to impede the purpose of the National Industrial Recovery Act.”  Id. at 34 (citation 
omitted). 
63 See BRODY, supra note 51, at 103. 
64 Id. 
65 In a statement by the Board of its principles, Milton Handler, general counsel of the 
Board, described the role and procedure of representation elections: “The Board has 
employed the device of an election by secret ballot under government supervision, when 
the employer has questioned the authority of any agency to act as representative of 
employees.  The Board has held that the manner of conducting the election is entirely 
within the discretion of the employees, and that the employer in no way can interfere with 
the conduct of the election.”  78 CONG. REC. 12016, 12029–30 (1934), reprinted in 1 
LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT, supra note 43, at 1177, 1210. 
66 See BRODY, supra note 51, at 103. 
67 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006); see A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).   
68 The Wagner Act is also a thoroughgoing realist document with respect to contract.  
The original findings and statement of purpose, first introduced by Senator Wagner, 
stated that “[t]he tendency of modern economic life toward integration and centralized 
control has long since destroyed the balanced bargaining power between individual 
employer and the individual employee, and has rendered the individual, unorganized 
worker helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract . . . .”  S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 2 (2d 
Sess. 1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT, supra note 43, at 1, 1.  Senator 
Wagner’s statements about the bill repeat this refrain, “Genuine collective bargaining is 
the only way to attain equality of bargaining power.”  78 CONG. REC. 3443, 3443 (1934) 
(statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT, supra note 43, at 
15.  “Simple, common sense tells us that a man does not possess this freedom [to act 
freely in his interest, and bargain candidly] when he bargains with those who control his 
source of livelihood.”  Id. at 16.   
The principle of collective bargaining has been attacked as a violation of the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of contract, since it does not preserve for 
each employer the right to make contracts with each of his employees as 
individuals.  Nothing can be more fallacious.  The fathers of our Nation did not 
regard freedom of contract as an abstract end.  They valued it as a means of 
insuring equal opportunities, which cannot be attained where contracts are 
dictated by the stronger party.   
 The law has long refused to recognize contracts secured by physical 
compulsion or duress.  The actualities of present-day life impel us to recognize 
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economic duress as well.  We are forced to recognize the futility of pretending 
that there is equality of freedom when a single workman, with only his job 
between his family and ruin, sits down to draw a contract of employment with 
a representative of a tremendous organization having thousands of workers at 
its call.  Thus the right to bargain collectively, guaranteed to labor by section 7 
(a) of the Recovery Act, is a veritable charter freedom of contract; without it 
there would be slavery by contract.  
78 CONG. REC. 3678, 3679 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT, supra note 
43, at 18, 20.   
 Only 150 years ago did this country cast off the shackles of political 
despotism.  And today, with economic problems occupying the center of the 
stage, we strive to liberate common man from destitution, from insecurity, and 
from human exploitation.  In this modern aspect of the timeworn problem the 
isolated worker is a plaything of fate.  Caught in a labyrinth of modern 
industrialism and dwarfed by the size of corporate enterprise, he can attain 
freedom and dignity only by cooperation with others of his group.  
79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 2321, 2321 
(1949) [hereinafter 2 LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT]. 
69 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372 § 9(c), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)) (“Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the 
representation of employees, the Board may investigate such controversy and certify to 
the parties . . . the representatives that have been designated or selected. In any such 
investigation, the Board shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either 
in conjunction with a proceeding under section 10 or otherwise, and may take a secret 
ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such 
representatives.”). 
70 In discussions of whether election determinations should be directly reviewable in 
court, the Act’s legislative history references the fact that “[a]n election is the mere 
determination of a preliminary fact, and in itself has no substantial effect on the rights of 
other employers or employees.  There is no more reason for court review prior to an 
election than for court review prior to a hearing.”  S. REP. NO. 74-573, at 14 (1935), 
reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT, supra note 68, at 2300, 2314. 
71 See infra Part II.D. 
72 See BRODY, supra note 51, at 102 (“[A]s a Brookings Institution study summed it up, 
‘The election was nothing with which the employer need be concerned.  It was a matter 
in which his employees alone had a stake.’”). 
73 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006). 
74 See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
75 See 78 CONG. REC. 10351, 10353 (1934) (article by Sen. Walsh) (“When a dispute 
arises, as is now so frequent, as to who are the representatives of the employees with 
whom the employer is required to deal for the purposes of collective bargaining, the 
Board may undertake to determine this question and to certify to the employer the names 
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of individuals or labor organizations that have been designated and authorized to 
represent employees by not less than a majority.”), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. WAGNER 
ACT, supra note 43, at 1117, 1121; 78 CONG. REC. 10559, 10560 (1934) (article by Sen. 
Walsh) (“One other important provision is that where a dispute takes place among 
employees as to who are the representatives to negotiate collective bargaining with their 
employer the board is authorized to take a secret ballot or use other suitable methods of 
determining what kind of an organization the majority of the employees desire and just 
who the majority of the employees desire to choose as their representatives.”), reprinted 
in 1 LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT, supra note 43, at 1122, 1126.  Note that Senator Walsh, 
the chair of the committee that reported the bill, hinted that interunion conflicts were in 
fact a form of employer opposition, presumably, because company unions were generally 
one party to the conflict.  Senator Walsh did not imagine elections playing a role outside 
of interunion conflicts. 
76 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).   
77 S. REP. NO. 73-1184, at 8 (1934) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. 
WAGNER ACT, supra note 43, at 1099, 1107. 
78 To Create a National Labor Board, supra note 43, at 566 (statement of Ralph Foster) 
(“Section 207 [predecessor of 9(c)] is another one to which we object, because it speaks 
of the secret ballot, but permits the Board to utilize any other appropriate method.  We 
think that the secret ballot is the only fair method and is the only method which is free 
from coercion; that the Board should be limited to the use of the secret ballot in the 
conduct of elections.”); Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Sen. Comm. on Education and 
Labor, 74th Cong. 40 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT, supra note 68, at 
2038, 2044–45 (statement of Clifford Cartwright) (“I think . . . the words ‘or utilize any 
other suitable method’ should be stricken.  What other method is more suitable than by 
secret ballot that is nothing but fair?  ‘Any other method’ could mean anything.”). 
79 See supra Part II.A. 
80 Railway Labor Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C. § 152(9) (2006). 
81 Id. (emphasis added); see also 74TH CONG., COMPARISON OF S. 2926 AND S. 1958 31 
(Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT, supra note 43, at 1319, 
1357. 
82 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
83 HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-
HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 133 (1950). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 In re The Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526, 531–32 (1939) (“We are thus faced 
with conflicting claims as to which of two labor organizations, each designated by a 
substantial number of the employees involved, is entitled, under the Act, to represent all 
of them.  Our determination of representatives looks to the initiation of collective 
bargaining between the Company and its employees.  We believe that since each of two 
contesting labor organizations has proved substantial adherence among the employees the 
bargaining relations which result will be more satisfactory from the beginning if the 
doubt and disagreement of the parties regarding the wishes of the employees is, as far as 
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possible, eliminated.  Although in the past we have certified representatives without an 
election upon a showing of the sort here made, we are persuaded by our experience that 
the policies of the Act will best be effectuated if the question of representation which has 
arisen is resolved in an election by secret ballot.  We shall, accordingly, direct that such 
an election be held.”); In re Armour & Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 567, 572 (1939) (“At the 
hearing, the Union offered evidence in support of its claim that the majority of the 
employees had designated it as their collective bargaining agent.  It requests certification 
upon the proof offered.  The Company, however, contests the Union’s claims.  It 
contends that an election is necessary to determine the wishes of the employees.  
Although in the past we have certified representatives without an election upon a 
showing of the sort made by this record, we are persuaded by our experience that, under 
the circumstances of this case, any negotiations entered into pursuant to a determination 
of representatives by the Board will be more satisfactory if all disagreement between the 
parties regarding the wishes of the employees has been, as far as possible, eliminated.  
We shall therefore direct that an election by secret ballot be held.”). 
88 See, e.g., Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 40 N.L.R.B. 532 (1942). 
89 MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 83, at 133–34. 
90 See id. at 87. 
91 Id. 
92 James A. Gross, The NLRB: An Historical Perspective, in A GUIDE TO SOURCES OF 
INFORMATION ON THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 3, 11–12 (Gordon T. Law, 
Jr., ed., Routledge Research & Information Guides in Business, Industry and Economic 
Institutions Series 2002).  The Board underwent intense scrutiny upon allegations of 
Communist influence.  The Smith Committee, a Special House Committee led by 
conservative congressman Howard Smith, “was a classic illustration of how a 
congressional investigation can be used to promote pre-conceived labor policies through 
skillful manipulation of its public hearings and careful management of the 
communications media as political instruments to influence public opinion and to achieve 
its predetermined political objectives.”  Id. at 12. 
93 MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 83, at 34. 
94 See Gross, supra note 92, at 11. 
95 Organized in 1937, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was more radical 
than the American Federation of Labor (AFL).  See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, 
Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1778 (2001) (“The rise of industrialism 
and the poor fit between the AFL’s craft unionism and the increasing numbers of workers 
employed in manufacturing processes led to the formation of a splinter group within the 
AFL, the Congress of Industrial Organizations.  Formally organized in 1937 as a distinct 
entity from the AFL, the CIO promoted a class-conscious unionism that contemplated 
worker solidarity across craft lines, indeed across the entire working class.  Working 
through the left wing of the Democratic Party, the CIO sought to advance the economic 
interests of the working class through lobbying for legislation that advanced the standard 
of living for all workers.”). 
 Employers tended to prefer the AFL to the CIO; therefore, the AFL proposed an 
amendment to the Wagner Act in 1939 that would have limited the Board’s discretion 
and authority in decision-making and would have encouraged employer support for a 
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preferred labor organization when different unions were fighting for one bargaining unit. 
Gross, supra note 92, at 11. 
96 See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the development of electoral processes under 
the NIRA. 
97 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 
(2006).   
98 See BRODY, supra note 51, at 107–08. 
99 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (2006) (“If the 
Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, 
it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.”). 
100 See H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 30 (1947) (“Under [Section 8(a)(5)], if an employer is 
satisfied that a union represents the majority and wishes to recognize it without its being 
certified under section 9, he is free to do so as long as he wishes, but as long as he 
recognizes it, or when it has been certified, he must bargain with it.  If he wishes not to 
recognize an uncertified union, or, having recognized it, stops doing so, the union may 
ask the Board to certify it under section 9.”), reprinted in NLRB, 1 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 321 (1985) 
[hereinafter 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA]; see also National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (2006) (restricting organizational picketing of employer with 
certified union); 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2) (establishing a twelve-month election bar). 
101 NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 478 (1941) (“In determining whether 
the Company actually interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees, the Board 
has a right to look at what the Company has said, as well as what it has done.”). 
102 See BRODY, supra note 51, at 146–47. 
103 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c); Va. Elec. & Power, 314 U.S. 469; 
NLRB v. Trojan Powder Co., 135 F.2d 337, 338–39 (3d Cir. 1943) (enforcing Board 
decision finding employer ULPs when “employer wrote to its employees a series of 
letters which the Board found had coerced ‘the employees into abandoning their 
organizational efforts.’”), cited in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537–38 (1945) 
(“When to [the employer’s lawful] persuasion other things are added which bring about 
coercion, or give it that character, the limit of the right has been passed.”). 
104 By codifying the employer’s “free speech,” Congress limited the Board’s ability to use 
a realist analysis of the effects of the employers’ speech on the employees, which varied 
on the basis of the specific facts of the organization situation.  A management speech 
made to one set of employees may have an entirely different effect on a different set of 
employees.  
 The Board’s regional offices were in a good position to observe the effects 
of pre-election statements by employers.  They reported great variation early in 
1947 in the extent to which such statements were used, depending on industry 
and area and influence of particular attorneys.  They were widely used in the 
South.  Many of the regions noted some elections lost when there were such 
pre-election campaigns by employers, although some thought the importance 
of these letters overestimated.  In general, the statements had little effect in the 
better-organized cities or long-organized areas, but in the “hinterlands” the 
story was quite different.  They were especially effective in isolated, rural 
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areas where employees were unsophisticated, sometimes illiterate, and newly 
organized, and the unions were weak.  They were sometimes effective also 
where there had been a history of good labor relations.  Sometimes, however, 
the effect was opposite to that which had been intended.  It was clear that 
greater freedom of employers to enter into the campaign as employees tried to 
organize was a real handicap to unions in some of the industries and areas 
where organization was still in an early stage and where freedom to organize 
was not yet thoroughly established.   
 This experience gave some indications as to the needs of sound policy.  If 
the purposes of the Act were still to be accomplished, it was important for the 
Board be willing and able to make a realistic appraisal of all the factors in 
particular situations and not hesitate to enjoin statements when they were 
clearly coercive in the entire context, including consideration of the social 
milieu.  The fact of employers’ dominance in one-industry towns and 
backwoods areas could not be ignored in deciding whether statements were 
coercive. . . . Moreover, the experience in 1947 showed how important it was 
to continue to use statements as evidence of motive in connection with other 
evidence of discrimination or other unfair labor practices, if employees were 
still to be protected from interference by some employers with their rights 
under the Act.  
MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 83, at 187–88. 
105 See 93 CONG. REC. 4479, 4558 (1947) (statement of Sen. Ball) (“I should like to 
emphasize also that the pending amendment and all the proposed amendments to the 
National Labor Relations Act make absolutely no change in the duties and obligations of 
employers.  The unfair labor practices of employers defined in section 8(a) of the pending 
measure are identical with the unfair practices defined in the present law.  Not one is 
changed. In fact, we have added one definition.  We make it an unfair labor practice for 
an employer to violate the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement.  If in spite of our 
care in trying to avoid it, lawyers discover loopholes in this bill by which employers can 
engage in a union-busting campaign, I shall be the first to try to plug those loopholes and 
to correct the situation by adding new definitions of unfair labor practices on the part of 
employers, if they are needed.”), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR 
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1161, 1199 (1985) [hereinafter 2 LEG. HIST. 
LMRA]. 
106 93 CONG. REC. 3572, 3579 (1947) (statement of Rep. Price), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. 
LMRA, supra note 100, at 669, 681.  See also 93 CONG. REC. A895, A895 (1947) 
(statement of, extension of remarks of Rep. Murray; reprint of Sen. Wagner, The Wagner 
Act—A Reappraisal) (“Moreover, all the propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding, the 
phenomenal growth of labor organization has taken place without any diminution of the 
employers’ constitutional right to free speech in labor relations.  The talk of restoring free 
speech to the employer is a polite way of reintroducing employer interference, economic 
retaliation, and other insidious means of discouraging union membership and union 
activity, thereby greatly diminishing and restricting the exercise of free speech and free 
choice by the working men and women of America.  No constitutional principle can 
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support this, nor would a just labor-relations policy result from it.”), reprinted in 2 LEG. 
HIST. LMRA, supra note 105, at 935, 935; 93 CONG. REC. 1884, 1911 (statement of Sen. 
Morse) (“[T]he question of employers’ freedom of speech has generated a great deal of 
heat in the hearings before the Senate committee.  It is, of course, self-evident that neither 
the Board nor the courts can impair the right of free speech guaranteed in the 
Constitution.  It is my impression that those who propose legislation designed to enlarge 
the employer’s right to express his views to his employees are not so much interested in 
vindicating their constitutional rights as they are in obtaining statutory immunity for acts 
and conduct which in fact interfere with and coerce employees.”), reprinted in 2 LEG. 
HIST. LMRA, supra note 105, at 939,  984. 
107 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540–41 (1992) (overturning Board 
determination that the union should have access to company property because the union 
had some possible methods of communicating with them off-site);  NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (“No restriction may be placed on the employees’ 
right to discuss self-organization among themselves, unless the employer can 
demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain production or discipline.  But no 
such obligation is owed nonemployee organizers.  Their access to company property is 
governed by a different consideration.  The right of self-organization depends in some 
measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages of self-organization from 
others.  Consequently, if the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees 
place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with 
them, the employer must allow the union to approach his employees on his property.” 
(citations omitted)).  “Access to employees, not success in winning them over, is the 
critical issue.”  Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540–41. (emphasis in original). 
108 In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948) (“With respect to the 
‘compulsory audience’ aspect of the speeches, the Trial Examiner concluded from all the 
evidence that the notices of the meetings as well as the oral instructions given to the 
employees concerning these meetings removed the element of choice from the employees 
and, in effect, compelled them to attend in violation of the Act. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Trial Examiner relied upon the ‘compulsory audience’ doctrine 
enunciated in [a previous Board case].  However, the language of Section 8(c) of the 
amended Act, and its legislative history, make it clear that the doctrine of the [earlier] 
case no longer exists as a basis for finding unfair labor practices in circumstances such as 
this record discloses.  Even assuming, therefore, without deciding, that the respondent 
required its employees to attend and listen to the speeches, we conclude that it did not 
thereby violate the Act.”). 
109 Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406–07 (1953) (“We reject the idea that the 
union has a statutory right to assemble and make campaign speeches to employees on the 
employer’s premises and at the employer’s expense.  We see no real distinction in 
principle between this and admitting an employer to the union hall for the purpose of 
making an antiunion speech, a suggestion which our dissenting colleague would 
doubtless view with abhorrence.  We believe that the equality of opportunity which the 
parties have a right to enjoy is that which comes from the lawful use of both the union 
and the employer of the customary fora and media available to each of them. It is not to 
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be realistically achieved by attempting . . . to make the facilities of the one available to 
the other.”). 
110 Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 593–94 (1954) (“[W]e are not holding in 
this decision that interrogation must be accompanied by other unfair labor practices 
before it can violate the Act.  We are merely holding that interrogation of employees by 
an employer as to such matters as their union membership or union activities, which, 
when viewed in the context in which the interrogation occurred, falls short of interference 
or coercion, is not unlawful. . . . In our view, the test is whether, under all the 
circumstances, the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with the 
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act.  The fact that the employees 
gave false answers when questioned, although relevant, is not controlling.  The 
Respondent communicated its purpose in questioning the employees—a purpose which 
was legitimate in nature—to the employees and assured them that no reprisal would take 
place.  Moreover, the questioning occurred in a background free of employer hostility to 
union organization.  These circumstances convince us that the Respondent’s interrogation 
did not reasonably lead the employees to believe that economic reprisal might be visited 
upon them by Respondent.”).  See also BRODY, supra note 51, at 106 (“[N]o amount of 
fine distinctions about time, place, and so on can alter the fact that, in the heat of a 
representation campaign, an interview in the supervisor’s office about how an employee 
feels about the company is coercive to that employee.”). 
111 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (“In election proceedings, it is the 
Board’s function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, 
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the 
employees.  It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is also our duty to determine 
whether they have been fulfilled.  When, in the rare extreme case, the standard drops too 
low, because of our fault or that of others, the requisite laboratory conditions are not 
present and the experiment must be conducted over again.”);  see infra Part III.A.4.a–b. 
112 BRODY, supra note 51, at 147. 
113 See supra Part II.B. 
114 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969). 
115 Id. at 602–03. 
116 See, e.g., Cal. Gas Transport, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (Aug. 31, 2006) 
(discriminatory discharge); Nat’l Steel Supply, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 177 
L.R.R.RM. (BNA) 1323 (June 30, 2005) (discriminatory discharge); Taylor Machine 
Products, Inc., 317 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1216–17 (1995) (threatened plant closure and 
discriminatory discharge); Somerset Welding & Steel, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 32 (1991) 
(threatened plant closure). 
117 Scholars have questioned the effectiveness of the Gissel bargaining order.  See, e.g., 
Terry A. Bethel & Catherine Melfi, The Failure of Gissel Bargaining Orders, 14 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 423 (1997).  Not only are Gissel bargaining orders not issued 
as often as they might be, but, when they are issued, they often fail to fix the problem of 
employer coercion and refusal to bargain.  Id.  The problems presented by a formal 
approach to “good-faith bargaining” enforcement are very serious, but far beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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118 The Second Circuit, in particular, has given little to no deference to the expert 
determinations of the Board that a bargaining order is justified by the circumstances.  See 
NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Rebecca 
Hanner White, Time for a New Approach, 69 N.C. L. REV. 639, 658 (1991) (“The Second 
Circuit, for example, has consistently refused to enforce the Board’s ‘Gissel’ bargaining   
. . . when the Board has failed to consider subsequent events or when ‘hallmark’ 
violations are not present.  Moreover, the Second Circuit has chastised the Board when it 
fails to adopt the court-constructed ‘Gissel’ standards.”). 
119 See Taylor Machine Products, 317 N.L.R.B. 1187; Somerset Welding & Steel, 304 
N.L.R.B. 32; Indiana Cal-Pro, Inc., v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 1292, 1301–02 (6th Cir. 1988); 
Jamaica Towing, 632 F.2d  at 212. 
120 See Bethel & Melfi, supra note 117. 
121 NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 602 F.2d 1100, 1104 (2d Cir. 1979). 
122 Patsy Bee, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 976, 977 (1980), enforcement denied, 654 F.2d 515 (8th 
Cir. 1981).  Interestingly, the Board in Patsy Bee did not cite the Jamaica Towing 
decision. 
123 Highland Plastics, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1981). Of course, the Board was only 
able to cite Jamaica Towing and Patsy Bee as authority to support this statement!  In this 
context, the use of the signal “see, e.g.” to indicate that Patsy Bee was but one of many 
such examples was particularly disingenuous.  Id. at 147 n.8. 
124 See Concrete Form Walls, Inc., 346 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 179 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1193 
(Apr. 13, 2006); Nat’l Steel Supply, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 177 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 
1323 (June 30, 2005); Cal. Gas Transport Co., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 118; Evergreen Am. 
Corp., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (2006); see also Memorandum from Fred Feinstein, NLRB 
General Counsel, to All NLRB Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident 
Officers (Nov. 10, 1999), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/ 
GC%20Memo/1999/gc99-8.html). 
125 See, e.g., The Register Guard, 344 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 177 L.R.R.M. 1382 (July 28, 
2005); Allied Mechanical, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 631 (2004); Hialeah Hospital, 343 
N.L.R.B. 391 (2004); United Scrap Metal, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2004-2005 NLRB 
Dec. (CCH) ¶ 16,881 (Mar. 31, 2005); S. Nuclear Operating Co., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 95 
(Dec. 29, 2006); Desert Toyota, 346 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 178 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1369 (Dec. 
23, 2005); Desert Toyota, 346 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 178 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1384 (Dec. 23, 
2005); Desert Toyota, 346 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 178 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1413 (Dec. 23, 2005); 
see also Erin Johansson, American Rights at Work, Is Another NLRB Election Really a 
Solution for These Workers? (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/eye-
on-the-nlrb/editions/is-another-nlrb-election-really-a-solution-for-these-workers.html 
(discussing the Board’s overturning of the ALJ’s bargaining order in Hialeah Hospital). 
126 Smithfield Foods, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 8 (Aug. 31, 2006) (“The judge 
concluded that, regardless of the results of the election, the Respondent engaged in 
repeated and pervasive unfair labor practices that warranted issuance of a remedial 
bargaining order based on proof that the Union had obtained valid authorization cards 
from a majority of unit employees. Under the particular circumstances of this case, we 
disagree.  We are concerned that due to the Board’s ‘long and unjustified delay in 
processing the case,’ a Gissel bargaining order would likely be unenforceable.  
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Accordingly, rather than possibly engender further litigation and delay over the propriety 
of a bargaining order, we decline to reach the question of whether a remedial bargaining 
order is appropriate here.  Instead, we find that employee rights would be better served by 
proceeding directly to a second election.” (citations omitted)).  The Board was right to 
think that the bargaining order would be difficult to enforce.  See Flamingo Hilton-
Laughlin v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1166, 1171–73 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (criticizing the Board for 
not considering the passage of time).  The irony (and the danger) of this logic is that an 
employer’s own misdeeds in delaying the litigation could exonerate the employer from a 
duty to bargain under Gissel. 
127 Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966). 
128 See, e.g., NLRB v. Universal Gear Service Corp., 394 F.2d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1968) 
(upholding NLRB decision) (“While the Union in the present case was not certified by 
the Board, there is no question but that it was lawfully designated the exclusive 
bargaining representative of the Company’s employees by means of the authorization 
cards, and was recognized as such by the Company.” (citations omitted)); NLRB v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 399 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1968) (upholding Board’s cease 
and desist order to enforce bargaining); NLRB v. Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., 474 F.2d 
1380, 1384 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding Board remedy) (“Having voluntarily determined 
that the Union had a majority status which entitled them to recognition as the 
representatives of its employees and having foregone the right to request an election, we 
cannot accede to the proposition that the employer can now unilaterally determine that 
the Unions no longer represent a majority of the employees and refuse to bargain with 
them.”). 
129 Keller Plastics, 157 N.L.R.B. at 586 (“[C]ertification must be honored for a 
reasonable period, ordinarily 1 year in the absence of unusual circumstances.”).  For a 
discussion of the original NLRB rule and the effect and purpose of the Taft-Hartley 
amendments in codifying the rule, see Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98–99 (1954) 
(“‘Unusual circumstances’ were found in at least three situations: (1) the certified union 
dissolved or became defunct; (2) as a result of a schism, substantially all the members of 
officers of the certified union transferred their affiliation to a new local or international; 
(3) the size of the bargaining unit fluctuated radically within a short time.” (citations 
omitted)).  Although the Court in Brooks mentioned that the bar had not been applied by 
the Board in the card-check context (id. at 101 n.9), the Brooks decision predated Keller 
Plastics, in which the Board invoked pre-Taft-Hartley board precedent creating the 
certification bar to justify a recognition bar.  See supra note 127 and accompanying text.  
The parallel language used by the Board in Keller Plastics strongly suggests that the 
recognition bar was meant to be a relatively simple application of an identical bar to that 
originally developed for certification prior to Taft-Hartley.  See id. 
130 For decades, many appellate court opinions have announced the rule that the 
recognition bar would operate for one year, absent unusual circumstances.  See 
Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[B]y voluntarily 
recognizing a union an employer waives its prerogative to insist upon an election.  The 
company thereby agrees in effect to treat the union as if it had won an election and to 
afford the union all the benefits that accompany full representational status.  Chief among 
those benefits is a conclusive presumption of continuing majority support for one year 
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after voluntary recognition.  Thus, by unlawfully refusing to negotiate with the Union 
absent an election only eight months after recognition, Exxel violated its promise to 
respect the desires of a majority of its employees and to allow the Union a reasonable 
time to negotiate.” (citation omitted)).  Accord NLRB v. Creative Food Design Ltd., 852 
F.2d 1295, 1300–02 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Hotel, Motel, & Restaurant Employees & 
Bartenders Union Local No. 19 v. NLRB, 785 F.2d 796, 798–99 (9th Cir. 1986); NLRB 
v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978); Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB, 
581 F.2d 767, 769–70 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 Board precedent on this issue has been extremely complicated.  See Brennan’s 
Cadillac, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 225, 225–27 (1977); Royal Coach Lines, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 
1037, 1038 (1987) (“A reasonable time is not measured by the number of days or months 
spent in bargaining, but by what transpired and what was accomplished in the bargaining 
sessions.”); see also MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 464 (1999) (finding that 
eleven months is reasonable in some circumstances); Ford Ctr. for the Performing Arts, 
328 N.L.R.B. 1 (1999) (finding that nine months is not reasonable in some 
circumstances). 
 A number of other courts have been much more circumspect in defining a reasonable 
time.  See NLRB v. Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., 474 F.2d 1380, 1383 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(“There is no doubt that if the bargaining relationship between the employer and the 
Unions had been established by Board certification after an election, the representative 
status of the Unions absent unusual circumstances would be irrebuttably presumed to 
continue for one year and after that time the presumption could be rebutted.  The Board 
has not fixed any period of mandated collective bargaining where uncertified unions are 
involved but has maintained that the employer must bargain for a reasonable time.” 
(citations omitted)); see also Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB, 965 F.2d 141, 145 
(7th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n employer usually may not withdraw recognition from a union for 
one year after the Board has certified the union as the employees’ bargaining 
representative despite questions about the union’s majority status. Similarly, an employer 
that voluntarily recognizes a union must bargain with the union for a reasonable time 
without questioning the union’s majority status.” (citations omitted)). 
131 See Keller Plastics, 157 N.L.R.B. at 586–87 (1966); cf. San Clemente Publ’g Corp., 
167 N.L.R.B. 6, 8 (1967) (“There is as much reason to require an employer to give such 
an agreement a reasonable period in which to function without regard to a union’s loss of 
majority status, as in the case of certifications, bargaining orders, and settlement 
agreements.  In each, a bargaining obligation arises, whether by Board action pursuant to 
law, or by voluntary commitment, and it is similarly easy to visualize the obstruction to 
effective bargaining and denigration of statutory policy that could result if the employer 
in any of the given situations were permitted to repudiate his obligation solely because 
the union in question has lost majority status.”). 
132 As discussed supra note 130, Board precedent has been extremely complicated and 
unpredictable and has varied dramatically according to the political affiliation of board 
members.  Compare Tajon, Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 327, 327–28 (1984) (considering less than 
two months to be sufficiently long to constitute a “reasonable time” because “the two 
negotiating meetings accomplished . . . substantial agreement on many issues”), with 
MGM Grand Hotel, 329 N.L.R.B. at 464 (finding that eleven months is reasonable in 
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some circumstances), and Ford Center for the Performing Arts, 328 N.L.R.B. at 1 
(considering the special difficulties associated with first contract bargaining as worthy of 
consideration in the determination of whether a “reasonable period” has passed). 
133 E-mail from Ed Gleason, Attorney, Int’l Bhd. Teamsters, to Jennifer Dillard (May 12, 
2007, 21:06 EST) (on file with authors).  Cf. Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28, at 4 n.11 
(Sept. 29, 2007) (“Chairman Battista would impose a maximum of 6 months for the 
insulated period.”). 
134 See Majestic Weaving, 147 N.L.R.B. 859, 860–61 (1964), enforcement denied on 
other grounds, 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Memorandum from Barry J. 
Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel for the NLRB Div. of Advice, to Martin M. Arlook, 
NLRB Regional Dir. for Region 10 (June 27, 2005), available at http://www.nlrb. 
gov/shared_files/Advice%20Memos/2006/10-CA-35554%2806-27-05%29.pdf; cf. Roger 
C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality 
Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 
401–03 (2001) (describing potential Majestic Weaving problems associated with card-
check/neutrality agreements). 
135 Seattle Mariners, 335 N.L.R.B. 563, 565 (2001); see also MGM Grand Hotel, 329 
N.L.R.B. at 467 (“[W]e find that, in balancing the competing goals of effectuating free 
choice while promoting voluntary recognition and protecting the stability of collective-
bargaining relationships, the purposes of the Act are best served by a finding that a 
reasonable time had not elapsed at the time the instant petitions were filed.  In reaching 
this conclusion, we recognize our dissenting colleagues’ concern for protecting the 
employees’ Section 7 right to choose their bargaining representative.  We take seriously 
the Act’s command to respect the free choice of employees as well as to promote stability 
in bargaining relationships.  The two statutory goals often require careful balancing by 
the Board.  In the instant case, we believe that such a balance has been achieved.”). 
136 See, e.g., NLRB v. Universal Gear Service Corp., 394 F.2d 396, 397–98 (6th Cir. 
1968) (“In an attempt to impart some stability to bargaining relationships, the Board early 
adopted a rule under which a union certification, if based on a Board conducted election, 
must be honored for ‘a reasonable period,’ generally one year. . . . While the Union in the 
present case was not certified by the Board, there is no question but that it was lawfully 
designated the exclusive bargaining representative of the Company’s employees by 
means of the authorization cards, and was recognized as such by the Company.” 
(citations omitted)); Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243, 1247–48 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (upholding Board’s decision not to order an election after employer signed card-
check agreement and union showed majority cards, finding that to do otherwise would be 
“inconsistent with the purposes of the NLRA”). 
137 Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28.  
138 Id. at 1.  It should be noted that the Board nonetheless held for the union because the 
Board decided to apply the rule only prospectively and declined to upset the bargaining 
relationships already established in reliance on the old rule.  Id. at 2. 
139 Id. 
140 For example, in December 2007, forty-one of sixty-two single-union elections held by 
the NLRB had dissenting minorities of 30 percent of eligible employees or greater.  See 
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NLRB, NLRB ELECTION REPORT 17–20 (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/ 
nlrb/shared_files/brochures/Election%20Reports/December2007.pdf. 
141 Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28, at 3.  
142 Id. at 10. 
143 Id. at 5 n.17. 
144 Id. at 5–6. 
145 The Board cites Linden Lumber v. NLRB for the proposition that the secret-ballot 
election is the best method for determining whether employees desire union 
representation.  See id. at 15 n.18.  Linden Lumber held that an employer may refuse to 
recognize a union based on a majority card showing.  Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 
U.S. 301, 309–10 (1974).  However, in Linden Lumber, the Court explicitly stated that 
the case does not affect situations where “the employer breaches his agreement to permit 
majority status to be determined by means other than a Board election.”  Id. at 310 n.10. 
146 Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28, at 6.  
147 Id. at 9–10.  
148 Retail Clerks Union Local 870, 192 N.L.R.B. 240 (1971); Houston Div. of Kroger 
Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388 (1975). 
149 Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388; Retail Clerks Union, 192 N.L.R.B. 240. 
150 “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this act, or 
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United 
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or 
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”  Labor Management Relations Act § 
301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006).  See Supervalu, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 11 
(Sept. 30, 2007) (Biblowitz, A.L.J.) (suggesting that after-acquired clauses are 
enforceable under Section 301). 
151 This elegant and simple provision has been the inspiration for incredible judicial 
creativity.  See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 465 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court makes § 301 a mountain instead of a molehill   
. . . .”).  The Court has read from the simple words of § 301 the authority to create a new 
body of substantive federal common law for the interpretation of labor contracts.  Id. at 
456. 
152 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 
153 See Hotel & Rest. Employees Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561, 
566–67 (2d Cir. 1993) (enforcing a card check neutrality agreement independent of 
majority status and citing concurring cases in the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits). 
154 See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 
155 See supra note 153. 
156 See, e.g., Supervalu, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 1 (Sept. 30, 2007) (holding that 
after-acquired clauses are generally a permissive subject of bargaining and can therefore 
be violated without implicating §8(a)(5)).  See also Shaw’s Supermarkets, 343 N.L.R.B. 
963 (2004). 
157 Shaw’s Supermarkets, 343 N.L.R.B. at 964 (“[W]e have some policy concerns as to 
whether an employer can waive the employees’ fundamental right to vote in a Board 
election.  It is clear that the Board’s election machinery is the preferred way to resolve 
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the question of whether employees desire union representation.  That method, as 
compared to a card check, offers a secret ballot choice under the watchful supervision of 
a Board agent.”). 
158 See, e.g., Hotel & Rest. Employees Union, 996 F.2d at 566 (“Although a court as 
noted—deferring to the NLRB—generally will not make an initial representation 
decision, an employer and labor organization are not thereby foreclosed from reaching a 
private agreement on union recognition.  Such a contract, which bypasses Board-
conducted elections, provides an alternative method for employees to accept or decline 
union representation.”). 
159 Shaw’s Supermarkets, 343 N.L.R.B. at 963. 
160 Id. 
161 Marriott Hartford Downtown Hotel, 347 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 180 L.R.R.M. 1057 (BNA) 
(Aug. 4, 2006). 
162 Id. at 1. 
163 New Otani Hotel & Garden, 331 N.L.R.B. 1078, 1080 (2000). 
164 If a contract waiver of board election is void for public policy because it infringes on 
employee free choice, how can voluntary recognition itself be legal?  A prior agreement 
to waive election has no more effect on the choice employees make than does a later 
waiver by voluntary recognition.  In neither situation is an election held, and in both 
situations cards alone prove majority status.  The only logical distinction is the effect of 
the waiver on the employer’s rights; card-check/neutrality agreements prevent an 
employer from changing its mind between the commencement of the card campaign and 
the attainment of majority status. 
165 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 600 n.17 (1969) (“Cards have been used 
under the act for 30 years; [the Supreme] Court has repeatedly held that certification is 
not the only route to representative status; and the 1947 attempt in the House-passed 
Hartley bill to amend section 8 (a)(5) . . . was rejected by the conference committee that 
produced the Taft-Hartley Act. No amount of drumbeating should be permitted to 
overcome, without legislation, this history.” (quoting Howard Lesnick, Establishment of 
Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 MICH. L. REV. 851, 861–62 (1967)). 
166 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (“In election proceedings, it is the 
Board’s function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, 
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the 
employees.”). 
167 See supra notes 22, 42–44 and accompanying text. 
168 Cf. BEN JONSON, THE ALCHEMIST (1616), reprinted in THE ALCHEMIST AND OTHER 
PLAYS, at 211, 281–82 (Gordon Campbell ed., 1998). 
(“He’s a divine instructor! can extract 
The souls of all things by his art; call all 
The virtues, and the miracles of the sun, 
Into a temperate furnace; teach dull nature 
What her own forces are.”). 
169 See supra Part I.A; infra Part IV. 
170 See infra Part III.A.4.b. 
171 See Dana Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1283, 1283 (2004). 
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172 The purpose of the laboratory conditions standard was originally to permit the Board 
to rerun an election even when no unfair labor practices were committed.  See General 
Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).  The dissent in General Shoe believed that 
only ULPs would be grounds for setting aside an election.  See id. at 127, 130–31 (1948). 
173 The free-speech provision of Taft-Hartley, § 8(c), presented a problem to the Board in 
creating fair elections.  National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).  
The majority in General Shoe ruled that the section only applied to unfair labor practices, 
not election objections.  General Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. at 127 n.10. 
174 See BRODY, supra note 51, at 106–07 (“For all its brave words, General Shoe . . . only 
demonstrated the futility of the law of employer free speech.  General Shoe’s ‘laboratory 
standard’ gave rise to another luxuriant case law, fascinating for the distinctions between 
the permissible and impermissible in misrepresentations of fact, racist appeals, third-party 
actions, and so on but of no real account for purposes of preventing ‘an atmosphere 
calculated to render a free choice improbable.’  The remedy for infractions that disqualify 
an election on the basis of the laboratory standard is only another election.  And below 
the screen of that standard the determined employer interrogates workers; requires them 
to attend captive-audience meetings; in multitudinous ways available to him pressures 
them relentlessly; and, if they remain uncowed, makes their lives miserable and their 
futures bleak.”). 
 The standards for finding ULPs because of employer “coercion” under § 8(a)(1) have 
also been criticized for being too permissive.  Note the following description of a 
February 1993 union drive for a two-plant unit in Louisiana: “The employer adopted a 
single theme: Vote union and you will lose your job.  This message was repeated via 
captive audience meetings, one-on-one discussions, written communications, bulletin 
boards, lawn signs, and radio ads.  Walls of the factories were covered with newspaper 
articles, blown up to five feet by three feet, about plant closings.  A twelve-foot-by-three-
foot banner proclaimed, ‘Wear the union label—UNEMPLOYED.’  Sets of two identical 
pairs of pants were hung around the factories, and supervisors explained that the only 
difference was that one pair was made in [the plants] for five dollars per hour and the 
other was made in Mexico for three dollars per day.  The NLRB refused to issue a 
complaint on unfair labor practice charges, in essence condoning the threats.  The union 
lost the election 275–222.”  Richard W. Hurd & Joseph B. Uchlein, Patterned Responses 
to Organizing: Case Studies of the Union-Busting Convention, in RESTORING THE 
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 61, 63 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994). 
175 See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First 
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 456 (1995) (“[T]he explicit and 
‘hidden’ coerciveness and hierarchy of the employment relationship invest most 
employer speech with coercive power. . . . As a policy option, employer speech has 
primarily strengthened managerial authority rather than fulfilling its stated aims of 
equalizing power and providing valuable information for the making of a ‘reasoned 
decision.’”). 
176 See supra note 174 on captive audience meetings and other employer tactics. 
177 Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-
Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE 
OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 174, at 75, 82.   
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 Under the “free speech” provisions of the NLRA, employers have virtually 
unlimited opportunities to communicate aggressively with their employees 
during union campaigns, at the same time as union access is tightly 
circumscribed if not totally restricted.  Under current labor law these employer 
communications can and often do include distortion, misinformation, threats, 
and intimidation, with very little chance of censure or penalty by the board or 
courts.  The pervasiveness and intensity of employer communications with the 
bargaining unit are measured in this study by both the number of captive 
audience meetings held and the number of company letters sent.  Union win 
rates declined dramatically as the number of meetings and letters increased, 
from more than 40 percent for campaigns in which no captive audience 
meetings were held or letters sent, down to 18 percent when the employer held 
twenty or more captive audience meetings and 37 percent when the company 
sent more than five letters during the campaign. . . .  
 The primary issues focused on by employers in these forums were strikes, 
dues and fines, and plant closings. According to the organizers surveyed, these 
messages often included blatant or veiled threats and repeated distortions or 
misinformation about the union.  Thus, in the atmosphere created by captive 
audience meetings, in which the union has no access and little influence, the 
coercive nature of the antiunion message can be extremely damaging to the 
union campaign. 
 . . . .  
 The ever-expanding “free speech” rights of the employer, in contrast with 
the ever-shrinking access rights of unions, allowed many employers in this 
sample to mislead, misinform, and outright lie to employees about the union in 
captive audience meetings, leaflets, mailings, media campaigns, and public 
forums.  Labor legislation that would better balance these rights would 
improve the ability of workers to make decisions regarding unionization 
without in any way constraining employers from expressing their opinions 
about unionization in a noncoercive manner.   
Id. at 82, 87. 
178 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602–04 (1969).  See Story, supra note 
175. 
179 See infra notes 245–53 and accompanying text.  The Supreme Court has recognized 
that the employer’s ability to control the employees’ paycheck has a coercive effect on 
the employee’s free choice.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 439 
(1964) (“The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist 
inside the velvet glove.  Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the source of 
benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and which 
may dry up if it is not obliged.”).  See also Bronfenbrenner, supra note 177, at 82 
(“Employers granted wage increases in 30 percent of the campaigns and made promises 
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of improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions in 56 percent, even though 
both of these actions can be considered violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.”). 
180 See Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 618 (“[A]n employer is free to communicate to his 
employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific views about a 
particular union, so long as the communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or 
force or promise of benefit.’”); Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 
263, 272 (1965) (“Although employees may be prohibited from engaging in a strike 
under certain conditions, no one would consider it a violation of the Act for the same 
employees to quit their employment en masse, even if motivated by a desire to ruin the 
employer.  The very permanence of such action would negate any future economic 
benefit to the employees.  The employer’s right to go out of business is no different.”). 
181 See infra notes 247–51. 
182 Hurd & Uchlein, supra note 174, at 61 (“Particularly problematic are NLRB policies 
that allow employers to wage no-holds-barred antiunion campaigns.  Even where there 
are legal restrictions on specific actions, the penalties for violations are so meager that 
they serve no deterrent effect.”).  See also id. at 64 (“A number of unions report that 
employers now are using the threat of legal delays to defeat unions.”); id. at 66 (“Some 
employers are not content to work within the friendly confines of NLRB regulations. 
Instead, they openly violate the law, most often by discriminating against the leaders of 
union organizing drives.  Nearly half the cases submitted to the IUD for this project 
included specific details of workers being disciplined, laid off, or fired for union activity. 
In most of them, the NLRB eventually ruled against the employer—but long after the 
organizing campaign had been halted by worker fear.”). 
183 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (“When . . . the [election] standard 
drops too low, because of our fault or that of others, the requisite laboratory conditions 
are not present and the experiment must be conducted over again.” (footnote omitted)). 
184 See infra Part III.A.1. 
185 See, e.g., John R. McIntyre, What Does ‘Lawfully Entitled To Be Present and 
Employed’ Mean to You?: Undocumented Workers & Make-Whole Remedies Under the 
NLRA, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 737, 737 (2000). 
186 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 208 (1941); Republic Steel Corp. v. 
NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940) (“The act is essentially remedial.  It does not carry a penal 
program . . . .”). Compare National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. §160(c) 
(2006), with Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006). 
187 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). 
188 See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A 
Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 373 (2002) (“The 
NLRA’s relatively weak remedial scheme also diminishes the effectiveness of the Act’s 
bargaining mandate.”); Ellen Dannin, From Dictator Game to Ultimatum Game . . . and 
Back Again: The Judicial Impasse Amendments, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 241, 275 
(2004) (“Union critics [of the NLRA] point to NLRB election delay, laws that cripple 
unions, striker replacement, and remedies that are so weak as to be useless, to name only 
a few.”); Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 57, 63 n.23 (2002) (“Although the law prohibits employers from threatening or 
coercing employees, the remedies for violations of the law are weak, and the vastly 
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unequal access to the employees makes it difficult for a union to respond even to the 
employer’s lawful persuasion.”); Mary Ann Leuthner, Comment, Need for a Ceasefire in 
the War on the Workers: Restoring the Balance and Hope of the National Labor 
Relations Act, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 925, 946 (2004) (“Not only do the long delays 
frustrate the remedies of the NLRA, but the remedies are so weak they do little to solve 
the devastating effect of the employer’s illegal action.  The remedies that are the most 
frequently used, namely cease and desist orders and reinstatement with back pay, do little 
to restore the collective rights of the surviving pro-union workers at the company.”).  
189 In the controversy surrounding the Hollywood Ceramics rule on the Board’s scrutiny 
of employer and union speech during the campaigns (see Shopping Kart Food Markets, 
Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977); General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 
(1978); Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982)), the Board considered an 
empirical study, JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW 
AND REALITY 109 (1976), comparing the results of authorization card signing to elections 
and used its finding that campaign activity rarely changed an employee’s mind as 
justification for relaxing coercive speech controls on the employer.  However, the Board 
did not consider whether this pattern justified giving greater deference to the card 
authorizations themselves, an equally applicable inference from the same information.  If 
employees rarely change their mind during a campaign, why go through the time, 
expense, and potential risk of discriminatory discharge associated with a campaign at all?  
See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 177, showing that ULPs do have a coercive impact, 
justifying the treatment of cards as better indicators of employee support.  The difficulty 
with all of these studies (and, in a sense, the bunny in the hat for each one) is the fact that 
card authorization signing is assumed to be the control against which the impact of 
employer activity in the campaign is measured.  This emphasizes the relational aspect of 
any realist inquiry.  See supra notes 22, 42, 44 and accompanying text. 
190 This analysis would identify whether collective representation would be in the rational 
self-interest of certain employees in the absence of coercion.  It would then compare the 
various methods (card check, elections) and determine which method most often resulted 
in employees voting in a manner consistent with their rational self-interest.  Assuming 
that people act in their rational self-interest, this analysis would identify the method in 
which employee choice was most free from coercion.  This analysis would, if taken too 
seriously, become another kind of formalism, in which free choice became defined as 
rational choice.  Such economic analysis is closely associated with public choice theory 
and law and economics.  Cf. MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).  
191 GORDON LAFER, AM. RIGHTS AT WORK, FREE AND FAIR? HOW LABOR LAW FAILS 
U.S. DEMOCRATIC ELECTION STANDARDS (2005), available at http://www.american 
rightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/FreeandFair%20FINAL.pdf. 
192 See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 
502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
193 See supra notes 185, 188 and accompanying text.  See also LAFER, supra note 191, at 
3 (listing factors, such as equal access to voters, free speech for both candidates and 
voters, equal access to the media, separation of state and party, leveling the playing field 
by controlling campaign finance, protecting voters from economic coercion, and timely 
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implementation of the voters’ will, as aspects of the U.S. democratic system that are 
lacking in the labor election context). 
194 See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Rest. Ass’n, House Legislation Infringes on Employee 
Rights and Privacy (Feb. 8, 2007), available at http://www.restaurant.org/pressroom 
/print/index.cfm?ID=1379 (“‘No one—employers or union organizers—should fear an 
election conducted by secret ballot.  It is the only way to protect an individual’s freedom 
to choose without subtle or overt coercion.  Private ballots protect free choice,’ said 
Anderson [the NRA president and CEO].”). 
195 See, e.g., Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304–07 (1974) (“To take the 
Board’s position [of no mandatory bargaining upon showing of a card-check majority] is 
not to say that authorization cards are wholly unreliable as an indication of employee 
support of the union.”). 
196 H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 3–6, 7–8 (1947) (Necessity for Legislation and Rights of 
Workers), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra note 100, at 294–97, 298–99; Labor 
Management Relations Act § 8(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (2006) (“If the Board 
finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall 
direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.”). 
197 Glenn M. Taubman, “Neutrality Agreements” and the Destruction of Employees’ 
Section 7 Rights, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, May 2005, at 101, 103 
(“[E]xperience shows that the process of soliciting union authorization cards relies upon 
coercion and misrepresentations, oftentimes with the complicity of the ‘neutral’ 
employer.”); Press Release, Nat’l Right to Work Legal Defense Found., Inc., Federal 
Labor Board to Reconsider Validity of Union Organizing Through Controversial “Card 
Check” Method (June 8, 2004), available at http://www.nrtw.org/b/nr_318.php (“Under 
these coercive agreements, employers typically grant union operatives sweeping access to 
their workplaces and employees’ personal information, strip workers of the opportunity 
to a secret ballot representation election, and hold mandatory ‘captive audience’ speeches 
about why employees should be unionized.  Workers are typically subjected to ‘card 
check’ drives in which union operatives bully workers face-to-face to sign union 
authorization cards that count as a ‘vote’ in favor of unionization.”). 
198 STAN GREER, NAT’L INST. FOR LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH, WHAT’S 
‘DEMOCRATIC’ ABOUT COMPULSORY UNIONISM? 10 (2003), available at 
http://www.nilrr.org/files/Whats%20Democratic%20About%20Compuslory%20Unionis
m.pdf (“One significant reason why signed cards don’t reliably reflect employees’ views 
is that union officials have a long, ongoing history of using threats and subterfuge to 
obtain them.”); 151 CONG. REC. S6156 (daily ed. June 7, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
DeMint) (“Supporting the right to a private vote and outlawing the corrupt card check 
practice of allowing union thugs to bully, harass, and scare workers who object to union 
membership is absolutely critical to democracy and freedom of choice.”). 
199 Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 129, Dana Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1283 (2004) (Nos. 8-RD-
1976, 6-RD-1518, 6-RD-1519) (emphasis added), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/ 
about/foia/DanaMetaldyne/petitioners.reply%20brief.pdf. 
200 See Brief Amici Curiae of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives at 2, Dana 
Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1283 (2004) (Nos. 8-RD-1976, 6-RD-1518, 6-RD-1519), available 
at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/foia/DanaMetaldyne/_Final%20Final%20CONGRESS 
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%20BRIEF.pdf (“The Board’s conduct of elections . . . is among the crown jewels of this 
nation’s practice of industrial democracy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Strengthening America’s Middle Class Through the Employee Free Choice Act: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions of the H. Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (statement of Charles I. Cohen, U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce) (“Neutrality and card check agreements therefore present a 
direct threat to the jurisdiction of the Board and its crown jewel, the secret ballot election 
process.”). 
201 Brief for HR Policy Ass’n, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9–10, Dana 
Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1283 (2004) (Nos. 8-RD-1976, 6-RD-1518, 6-RD-1519), available 
at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/foia/DanaMetaldyne/HRPolicy_DanaCorp1.pdf 
(“Because they safeguard employee confidentiality and freedom of choice, Board-
conducted, secret-ballot elections have been recognized by Congress, the courts, and the 
NLRB as the best and most reliable method of resolving questions concerning union 
representation.”); Press Release, Nat’l Rest. Ass’n, House Legislation Infringes on 
Employee Rights and Privacy (Feb. 8, 2007), available at http://www.restaurant.org/ 
pressroom/print/index.cfm?ID=1379) (“‘No one—employers or union organizers—
should fear an election conducted by secret ballot.  It is the only way to protect an 
individual’s freedom to choose without subtle or overt coercion.  Private ballots protect 
free choice,’ said Anderson [the NRA president and CEO].”); 151 CONG. REC. S6156 
(daily ed. June 7, 2005) (statement of Sen. DeMint) (stating that protection of worker’s 
free choice “can be achieved by simply requiring unions to win a majority of worker 
support in an anonymous, secret ballot election which eliminates the shroud of union 
intimidation tactics.”). 
 Indeed, one anti-card-check legislator argues that the secret ballot is the only dividing 
line between a repressive and a democratic government.  Id.  (“Secret ballots are an 
absolutely essential ingredient for any functioning democratic system.  The lack of 
secret-ballot elections is how oppressive regimes manage to stay in power without 
majority support.  Repelling such oppression hinges on the ability to walk into a voting 
booth, pull the curtain, and vote for anyone or anything we please with confidence the 
vote will be counted but never revealed to anyone who could use the knowledge to 
retaliate.”).  This conflation of the rights of citizens to vote in governmental elections 
with the employee’s choice of union representation was best portrayed in Rockwell 
International, where the employer “contend[ed that] the only issue involved is the 
constitutional right of every American citizen to vote.”  Rockwell Int’l Corp., 220 
N.L.R.B. 1262, 1263 (1975). 
202 Brief Amici Curiae of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, supra note 200, 
at 10 (“In an election, competition between the employer and union for the employees’ 
votes guarantee that the employees—whose choice is at issue—are courted by both 
parties. . . . This competition guarantees a substantial flow of information and assistance 
to the voters.  The information would consist of one party’s own position and a critique 
or refutation of the other party’s positions, and the other party would provide similar 
information on its adversary.  Assistance would include dissections of the other party’s 
materials, warnings about the consequences of a vote, and a ready willingness to bring, or 
assist the employees in bringing, to the Board’s attention the rival’s ULP’s or breaches of 
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laboratory conditions.  In contrast, card checks, particularly when accompanied with 
neutrality agreements, eliminate this competition.  Employees are asked to take some step 
which may commit them to a collective bargaining representative, but they may be 
furnished no or inaccurate information.  There is no competing party willing to admit or 
provide contrary information, to warn of the consequences, or to advise employees 
regarding their rights and possible violations.”). 
203 Taubman, supra note 197 (“Unions repeat the Orwellian mantra that ‘secret ballot 
elections are unfair.’”).  See also Petitioner’s Joint Brief on the Merits at 27, Dana Corp., 
343 N.L.R.B. 1283 (2004) (Nos. 8-RD-1976, 6-RD-1518, 6-RD-1519), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/foia/DanaMetaldyne/Petitioner.pdf (“Every American 
understands instinctively that [secret-ballot] elections are the cornerstone of any system 
that purports to be democratic.”); National Restaurant Association, Public Policy Issue 
Briefs: Card-Check Legislation, http://www.restaurant.org/government/Issues/Issue.cfm? 
Issue=card-check (last visited Mar. 22, 2007) (“America’s political system is based on 
respect for individual liberty and democracy.  Abolishing secret ballots for American 
workers goes against what America stands for.  If Congress passes [EFCA], they will be 
stripping away all the protections that federally protected secret ballots provide for 
American workers.”); 153 CONG. REC. H2103 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Foxx) (“It is the Communist Party.  The Communist Party of the United States favors 
[EFCA].  And I think it is very important that the American public understand that.  Our 
folks are aligning themselves with the Communist Party.  The people who support this 
bill are aligning themselves with the Communist Party of the United States.  Now, I 
would be a little bit concerned about that if I were them, but it doesn’t seem to bother 
them in the least that they advocate communistic practices.”). 
204 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (“In election proceedings, it is the 
Board’s function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, 
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the 
employees.”). 
205 See, e.g., Petitioner’s Joint Brief on the Merits, supra note 203 (“In secret-ballot 
elections, the Board provides a ‘laboratory’ in which an experiment may be conducted     
. . . . In contrast, the fundamental purpose and effect of a ‘voluntary recognition 
agreement’ is to eliminate Board-supervised ‘laboratory conditions’ protecting employee 
free choice, and to substitute a system in which unions and employers have far greater 
leeway to pressure employees to accept union representation.” (citations omitted)). 
206 See Story, supra note 176, at 409 n.276 (“The laboratory conditions’ test for 
elections—also known as the General Shoe doctrine—did not require a finding of 
employer fault, but instead focused on whether coercion was present, regardless of 
source.  This test fell into disfavor in the late 1960s; today, a finding of employer fault 
stemming from intentional and demonstrable employer coercion is usually required to 
void an election.” (citation omitted)). 
207 For example, the petitioners in Dana/Metaldyne rely on General Shoe and Gissel in 
their explanation of the requirement of laboratory conditions.  See, e.g., Petitioner’s Joint 
Brief on the Merits, supra note 203; General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. at 126–27 (setting 
aside a tainted election when employer actions violated laboratory conditions: “The 
significant element is the method selected by this Company’s president to express his 
894 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE 
 
anti-union views to the employees on the day before the election.  He had them brought 
to his own office in some 25 groups of 20 to 25 individuals, and there, in the very room 
which each employee must have regarded as the locus of final authority in the plant, read 
every small group the same intemperate anti-union address.  In our opinion, this conduct  
. . . went so far beyond the presently accepted custom of campaigns directed at 
employees’ reasoning faculties that we are not justified in assuming that the election 
results represented the employees’ own true wishes.”); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 
U.S. 575, 579 (1969) (allowing the Board to rely on cards to issue a bargaining order 
when the employer has committed massive unfair labor practices to undermine the 
employees’ support of the union). 
208 See, e.g., Keith J. Gross, Separate To Unite: Will Change To Win Strengthen 
Organized Labor in America?, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 75, 122 (2005) (“Three-quarters 
of employers involved in NLRB elections hire ‘union-busting firms’ to avoid 
unionization, and 25 percent of employers fire union supporters in those elections.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
209 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Wackenhut Corp. in Support of the Petitioners, Dana 
Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1283 (2004) (Nos. 8-RD-1976, 6-RD-1518, 6-RD-1519), available 
at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/foia/DanaMetaldyne/Wackenhut1.pdf; see also NAT’L 
INST. FOR LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH, BIG LABOR-FUNDED STUDY DEEPLY FLAWED 
2 (2006), available at http://www.nilrr.org/files/Flawed%20Card%20Check%20Study 
.pdf (“Union officials pressure employers to grant them monopoly control over 
employees through card collection alone by battering them with negative PR blitzes, 
costly and embarrassing lawsuits, strikes, stockholder actions, and political interventions.  
Employers who succumb to the pressure may help union organizers collect cards by 
forcing employees to sit through one-sided presentations extolling unionization, as well 
as by giving union organizers sweeping access to company premises and employees’ 
home addresses and phone numbers.”); 151 CONG. REC. S6156 (daily ed. June 7, 2005) 
(statement of Sen. DeMint) (“Under current law, employers may voluntarily recognize 
unions based on these card checks, but are not required to do so. However, threats, 
boycotts, and other forms of public pressure are increasingly being used to force 
employers to recognize unions based on a card-check rather than the customary secret 
ballot election.”). 
210 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Wackenhut Corp. in Support of the Petitioners, supra note 
209, at 6 (“Coercive attempts by unions to force employers to enter into such agreements 
is [sic] an equally pernicious problem [as the problems that arise after the card-check 
agreements are signed].”). 
211 Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 199, at 9 (“Indeed, [union advocates] refuse to 
recognize that employers and unions often enter into pre-recognition agreements with 
less than pure motives.  This includes avoiding the ‘stick’ of union pressure tactics like 
corporate campaigns, and/or obtaining the ‘carrot’ of sweetheart collective bargaining 
agreements in the future.”). 
212 See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 73 (2006); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); 
Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 So.2d 529 (Ala. 2003). 
213 See Schmitz, supra note 212. 
    Fetishizing the Electoral Process  895 
VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 2 • 2008 
 
214 See Hale, supra note 44, at 470–94. 
215 Press Release, Nat’l Right to Work Legal Defense Found., supra note 197 (“If the 
NLRB voids the ‘voluntary recognition bar’ and a decertification election is allowed and 
successful [in Dana/Metaldyne], the UAW would lose its power to act as the ‘exclusive 
bargaining representative’ of the employees at Dana and Metaldyne.  The employees 
would then be free to negotiate their own terms and conditions of employment.”). 
216 See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 50 (1990) (arguing that the inherent power imbalance prevents 
employees from negotiating good-cause protection from termination in at-will-
employment agreements).  The sole basis for identifying “at will” employment as “free” 
is the right of the employee to quit the job at any time.  However, this fails to distinguish 
the employment contract from the employee/union agreement because employees are 
similarly free to “quit” the union any time they please by leaving the workplace.  If card 
check is inherently coercive, despite not only the right to quit but the ULP protections of 
the NLRA, then at-will-employment contracts are also coercive. 
217 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002) 
(finding that a mandatory arbitration agreement signed by the employee does not 
preclude EEOC from pursuing discrimination claim on behalf of the at-will employee). 
218 Taubman, supra note 197 (“[Labor union officials] advocate the card check process 
because they know that with it they can bring to bear enormous pressure on vulnerable 
employees.”).  Management advocates go so far as to declare that a contract cannot be 
relied on to show the will of the employees; instead, only an election can be relied upon.  
Petitioner’s Joint Brief on the Merits, supra note 203, at 35 (“First, the dissent’s 
argument is rooted in the assumption that an employer designating a particular union as 
the representative of its employees automatically means that an uncoerced majority of 
employees actually supported union representation at the time of employer recognition.  
Not only is this assumption unwarranted, it is an assumption regarding the ultimate 
question at issue: does the employer-recognized union, the UAW, actually have the 
uncoerced support of a majority of employees?  An election is necessary to answer this 
question.”). 
219 Petitioner’s Joint Brief on the Merits, supra note 203 (“The contrast between the rules 
governing a Board supervised secret-ballot election and the ‘rule of the jungle’ governing 
‘card checks’ could not be more stark.”).  This “rule of the jungle” is the common law of 
freedom of contract.  See also Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 199, at 14. (“All card 
check campaigns are inherently coercive, precisely because they lack the requisite 
safeguards—like secret ballot voting—that make the Board elections the only standard 
entitled to ‘bar quality.’”). 
220 See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. E260 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2007) (statement of Rep. George 
Miller, extension of remarks) (“The Employee Free Choice Act would add some fairness 
to the system by . . . allowing a majority of employees the opportunity to select to be 
represented by a union by expressing their decision through the signing of authorization 
cards.”).  Union advocates also use the contract formalism logic to support the use of 
neutrality agreements with employers.  The employee-signed cards and the employer-
signed neutrality agreements present very different issues; however, because the analogy 
to contract law is extremely strong in both situations, contract formalism tends to the 
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obscure the differences between the two.  The most important relationship is the potential 
effect that the choice of an employer to sign a neutrality agreement may have on the 
environment in which employees signed cards.  However, characterizing this change in 
the environment as more or less conducive to free choice for employees requires making 
assumptions and dealing with facts that are irrelevant under contract formalism.  
Therefore, union advocates employing the contract method must apply a kind of 
functionalism in order to identify and deal with these criticisms.  See AM. RIGHTS AT 
WORK ISSUE BRIEF,  FACT OVER FICTION: OPPOSITION TO CARD CHECK DOESN’T ADD 
UP 3 (2006), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAW 
Reports/IBFactOverFictFinal.pdf (“Card check procedures are commonly paired with 
neutrality agreements.  These voluntary pacts between employers and union 
representatives establish a code of conduct that prohibits each party from disparaging the 
other or using intimidating, coercive tactics on employees.  Under this process, both 
parties work together to set rules that give workers a chance to freely decide to form a 
union without pressure or interference from either side.”).  Similar issues regarding free 
choice have arisen for a number of decades in the context of as acquired card check store 
clauses common in the grocery store industry. See Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n Local No. 
455 v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1975).; infra Part III.A.3. 
221 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae General Motors Corp. et al. at 16, Dana Corp., 341 
N.L.R.B. 1283 (2004) (Nos. 8-RD-1976, 6-RD-1518, 6-RD-1519) available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/foia/DanaMetaldyne/GM%20DC%20Ford1.pdf (“The 
essential caveat, and one fully recognized by Dana and the Union, is that at all times the 
affected employees will make the ultimate decision whether they want the approach to 
collective bargaining indicated in the [card-check agreement], a more conventional, 
militant style of representation from another union, or no union at all.”). 
222 In her statement to the Senate committee, Estlund demonstrated a similar attitude 
towards the effect of union coercion on employees’ choice as the employers’ attitude 
towards employer-instigated coercion: “Most of the controversy surrounding the 
proposed use of authorization cards is based on fears of union coercion and 
misrepresentation in the solicitation of cards.  It is certainly possible for that to happen, 
just as it is possible for employers to coerce employees to sign cards seeking 
decertification of a union.  In either case, the coercion would be illegal and the cards 
would be invalid, and the Board must pass on those issues before ordering certification or 
decertification.”  Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Professor Cynthia Estlund, 
Professor of Law, New York University Law School). 
223 See supra Part I.B.  In addressing these criticisms, card-check advocates generally 
emphasize that signatures obtained through “coercion” would be invalid.  Dana Corp., 
341 N.L.R.B. 1283, 1286 (2004) (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting).  This 
response misses the point in precisely the way that would be expected under contract 
formalism.  By concluding that preventing “coercion” is adequate to protect free choice, 
card-check neutrality advocates are simply restating the assumptions of contract 
formalism, not truly responding to the criticism.  The definition of coercion does not 
include uninformed or irrational decision-making.  One statement of this contractual 
formalism is found in Aero Corp., where one Board member found that “the best 
evidence of employees’ intent in signing cards is the statement on the cards to which they 
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put their signatures.  Accordingly, absent evidence of fraud or coercion, he would not 
permit inquiry into the nature of the representations union solicitors may have made in 
soliciting membership.”  Aero Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 1283, 1290 n.18 (1964).  The 
criticisms of card check that focus on employee lack of information or subtle pressures 
inherent in card signing procedures are criticisms of foundational assumptions of 
contractualism. 
224 See Aero Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. at 1290 (“The validity of such affirmation can be 
overcome only by establishing that the Union obtained the signatures through coercion—
and there is no hint of such coercion in the record—or that the Union obtained the 
signatures by representing to the employees that, despite the purpose clearly and 
expressly stated on the cards themselves, the cards would be used only for a different, 
more limited purpose.  This must be done on the basis of what the employees were told, 
not on the basis of their subjective state of mind when they signed the cards.” (footnote 
omitted)); Winco Petroleum Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1132 (1979) (Plaine, A.L.J.) 
(“[E]mployees as a rule are not too unsophisticated to be bound, and should be bound, by 
the clear language of what they sign unless that language is deliberately and clearly 
canceled by a union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to disregard and 
forget the language above his signature . . . .”). 
225 See NAT’L INST. FOR LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH, supra note 209, at 5–6 (claiming 
that employees want their employers to provide information about the drawbacks of 
unionism); see also Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268, 1269 (1963) (“In this 
case the cards, on their face, explicitly authorized the Union only to act as bargaining 
agent of the employees, and . . . the failure of the Union’s solicitors to affirmatively 
restate this authorization does not indicate that it was abandoned or ignored.  Thus, there 
is no evidence here to negative the overt action of the employees in signing cards 
designating the Union as their bargaining agent, and the instant situation is not one in 
which the Union has beguiled employees into signing union cards.”). 
226 See, e.g., NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401–02 (1952) (“The [NLRA] is 
designed to promote industrial peace by encouraging the making of voluntary agreements 
governing relations between unions and employers.”); NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co., 
578 F.2d 238, 241 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Voluntary recognition is a favored element of 
national labor policy.”); MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 464, 466 (1999) (“It is a 
long-established Board policy to promote voluntary recognition and bargaining between 
employers and labor organizations, as a means of promoting harmony and stability of 
labor-management relations.”). 
227 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006).  See Dana Corp., 351 
N.L.R.B. No. 28, at 3 (Sept. 29, 2007) (“We do not question the legality of voluntary 
recognition agreements based on a union’s showing of majority support.  Voluntary 
recognition itself predates the National Labor Relaions Act and is undisputedly lawful 
under it.” (footnote omitted)); see also Alexia M. Kulwiec, “On the Road Again” (to 
Organizing): Dana Corp., Metaldyne Corp., and the Board’s Attack on Voluntary 
Recognition Agreements, 21 LAB. LAW. 37, 37–38 (2005).  The legislative history, 
particularly of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act, also supports this view.  
The conference committee specifically defeated the House version of the bill that would 
have made elections the only manner by which a union could become the exclusive 
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representative.  See H.R.3020, 80th Cong. § 8(a)(5), at 20–21 (1947) (“It shall be an 
unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees currently recognized by the employer or certified as 
such under section 9.”),  reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra note 100, at 31, 50–51.  
On this point, the Taft-Hartley amendments as enacted included the Senate version, 
which provided for management-initiated petitions for election under certain 
circumstances.   See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B); see also New Otani Hotel & Garden, 331 
N.L.R.B. 1078 (2000) (holding that the employer cannot file an election petition because 
union request for card-check neutrality agreement is not a present demand for recognition 
triggering employer’s right to petition).  The enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments, 
which  specifically declined to eliminate voluntary recognition after it had been 
recognized as a part of the Wagner Act for over a decade, is strong evidence that the 
Board and courts since the 1930s have historically been correct in interpreting the Act to 
encourage voluntary recognition. 
228 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158. 
229 See id. § 157. 
230 Id. § 158(b)(1). 
231 For example, the Board does not closely police the information that unions give to 
employees regarding the potential uses of the cards.  See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co., 172 
N.L.R.B. 732, 732 (1968) (“The Respondent has excepted to the Trial Examiner’s failure 
to invalidate a substantial number of the 87 cards on the ground that the employees, in the 
course of solicitation, were told that the cards would be used to get an election, or only to 
get an election.  The cards on their face, however, spell out in clear and unambiguous 
language an authorization for the Union to represent the signer for collective bargaining.  
The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that although in some instances the possibility 
of an election was mentioned, none of these employees were told either in specific terms, 
or in general assurances that were susceptible to such interpretation or inference, that the 
cards would be used only for the purpose of getting an election.  In these circumstances, 
we, like the Trial Examiner, find no merit in the Respondent’s contention that the 
challenged cards on which we rely should be invalidated as having been obtained through 
misrepresentation.”). 
232 As stated in supra note 220, realism creeps into the union analysis when it describes 
the importance of neutrality agreements. 
233 See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card 
Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42 (2001) (noting that in a study of 132 
organizing campaigns, 62.5 percent of card-check campaigns result in representation; 
78.2 percent of card-check neutrality campaigns result in representation; and 45.5 percent 
of secret-ballot elections result in representation). 
234 See CHIRAG MEHTA & NIK THEODORE, AM. RIGHTS AT WORK, UNDERMINING THE 
RIGHT TO ORGANIZE: EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR DURING UNION REPRESENTATION 
CAMPAIGNS (2005), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ 
ARAWReports/UROCUEDcompressedfullreport.pdf (demonstrating that as employers 
increase their types of ULPs during the secret-ballot election campaign, the union success 
rate decreases). 
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235 AM. RIGHTS AT WORK ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 220, at 3 ( “[C]ard check and 
neutrality agreements [are] a viable, democratic alternative to an NLRB election process 
fraught with problems. . . . [A]ggressive unionbusting in the weeks before the vote and a 
weak labor law system that fails to protect workers from employer interference in NLRB 
elections corrupts [sic] the democratic integrity of this process. . . . [However, restricting 
union representation campaigns to the] archaic and undemocratic NLRB election process 
[would] severely tilt[] the playing field in the employer’s favor.”). 
236 Bronfenbrenner, supra note 177, at 75 (“Although there has been a great deal of 
research on the relationship between employers’ unfair labor practices and election 
outcomes, there has been very little research on the broad range of legal and illegal tactics 
used by employers during the NLRB election process, regardless of whether unfair labor 
practices were actually filed.  Even fewer studies have controlled for the influence of 
bargaining unit demographics, organizer background, and union tactics during organizing 
campaigns.  In addition, only a handful of studies have examined employer and union 
behavior during first-contract campaigns, even though a union election victory is at best 
Pyrrhic without a first-contract victory.  The study can therefore provide new and 
important insights into the impact of NLRB practices and employer behavior on election 
and first-contract outcomes . . .”).  In the study, Bronfenbrenner compares cards collected 
to the ultimate outcome based on a wide variety of employer behaviors.  See 
Bronfenbrenner, supra note 177.  This is the ultimate realist analysis when it comes to 
elections; however, it assumes, for comparison, a baseline of card-expressed opinion.  
The result is that, the extent to which an election fails to measure the employees’ free will 
is determined only in relation to cards themselves, which is contract formalism.  Union-
friendly studies like this do not attempt to measure the difference between opinion 
expressed through cards, and what the employees “really want.”  By isolating and 
analyzing as a scientific variable all the activities the employer undertakes, union 
advocates can portray the choices of employees made during election campaign as being 
improperly influenced by tactical choices made by the employer. 
237 A similar and perhaps more obvious double standard applies when unions discuss the 
representational methods used in decertification proceedings.  Unions have advocated for 
secret-ballot elections as the only method for decertification of a union.  The AFL-CIO 
argued that “employee petitions and cards advocating decertification ‘are not sufficiently 
reliable indicia of the employees’ desires,’ and that employees and employers should 
only be able to remove a union pursuant to a secret-ballot election.”  Petitioners’ Joint 
Brief on the Merits, supra note 203, at 25 (citing Brief of the AFL-CIO to the NLRB at 
13, Chelsea Indus., 331 N.L.R.B. 1648 (2000) (No. 7-CA-36846)). 
238 See, e.g., American Rights at Work, Why Majority Sign-Up Is Needed (2004), 
www.americanrightsatwork.org/employee-free-choice-act/resource-library/why-majority-
sign-up-is-needed.html (“Union elections are unlike any other kind of elections because 
of the inherent coercive power that management holds over employees—the power to 
deprive employees of their livelihood and to control their pay, hours and working 
conditions.  According to a survey of 400 NLRB election campaigns in 1998 and 1999, 
36 percent of workers who vote against union representation explain their vote as a 
response to employer pressure.  The NLRB election process makes matters worse by 
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enabling management to wage lengthy and bitter anti-union campaigns, during which 
workers can expect harassment, intimidation, threats and firings.”). 
239 See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126–27 (1948) (“On this record, therefore, 
although the respondent’s activities immediately before the election, as described in the 
Intermediate Report, are not held to constitute unfair labor practices within the meaning 
of the amended Act, certain of them created an atmosphere calculated to prevent a free 
and untrammeled choice by the employees. . . . In our opinion, this conduct, and the 
Employer’s instructions to its foremen to propagandize employees in their homes, went 
so far beyond the presently accepted custom of campaigns directed at employees’ 
reasoning faculties that we are not justified in assuming that the election results 
represented the employees’ own true wishes. . . . In election proceedings, it is the Board’s 
function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under 
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the 
employees. It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is also our duty to determine 
whether they have been fulfilled. When, in the rare extreme case, the standard drops too 
low, because of our fault or that of others, the requisite laboratory conditions are not 
present and the experiment must be conducted over again.” (footnote omitted)). 
240 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610–11 (1969). 
241 See, e.g., Redmond Plastics, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. 487 (1970). 
242 See supra Part III.B. 
243 For an explanation of the Board’s policies on information provided by union 
organizers during card-check campaigns, see supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.  
Because unionization is an inherently political topic, neutral information on the benefits 
and drawbacks of unions is difficult, if not impossible, to find.  For example, a Google 
search of “labor union facts” returns links to dozens of partisan sites, including, among 
the top ten hits, The Center for Union Facts, an unabashedly antiunion site; The 
Forgotten Facts of American Labor History, espousing an antiunion, freedom of contract 
doctrine; the AFL-CIO website, with their own Union Facts section; and the WakeUp 
Wal-Mart site, which advocates the unionization of Wal-Mart. 
244 For an explanation of adhesion contract coercion, see supra note 212 and 
accompanying text. 
245 See supra Part III.C. 
246 The at-will-employment doctrine “allows employers to fire employees ‘for no cause or 
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.’ In other 
words, the employment at-will doctrine allows an employer to discharge an employee for 
almost any reason or for no reason, as long as contrary statutory or contractual provisions 
do not exist.”  Edwin Robert Cottone, Comment, Employee Protection from Unjust 
Discharge: A Proposal for Judicial Reversal of the Terminable-at-Will Doctrine, 42 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1259, 1259 (2002).  For an explication of the Darlington decision 
allowing employers to go out of business for retaliatory reasons, see James Gray Pope, 
How American Workers Lost the Right To Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
518, 544–50 (2004).   
[T]here is much more to retaliatory shutdowns than mere spite or malice.  Like 
sympathy strikes and secondary strikes, they produce valuable benefits—
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benefits that are reaped not directly by the perpetrator, but by fellow members 
of the perpetrator’s class.  The shutdown operates like a public flogging, 
intimidating not only the victims themselves, but also every worker who hears 
of their plight.  Darlington excludes this effect from consideration unless the 
employer stands to gain individually from the intimidation of its own 
remaining employees.  Employers that act out of class solidarity, helping to 
produce a cowed and compliant workforce for their fellow employers, are 
privileged to commit what would otherwise be statutory violations.   
Id. at 548. 
 These forms of legal employer coercion have an historical pedigree in America.  See 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 676–77 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
Gerald E. Bevan trans., 2003) (“I have demonstrated in a previous chapter how the 
aristocracy, once expelled from political life, had withdrawn into certain areas of 
industrial enterprise and had created its power there in a different form.  This has a strong 
influence on the rate of wages.  As one must already be very rich to take on the great 
industries of which I speak, the number of entrepreneurs is very small.  Being few in 
number they can easily league together and fix the level of wages as they like.  Workmen, 
by comparison, are very numerous and their numbers are constantly on the increase for, 
from time to time, extraordinary periods of prosperity occur when wages rise wildly, 
attracting people in the locality into the manufacturing industry.  Now, once men have 
embarked upon this career, we have seen that they cannot escape from it because they 
soon pick up habits of body and mind which render them unsuited for any other work.  
These men usually lack education, energy, or resources.  They are, therefore, at their 
master’s mercy.  When competition, or any other circumstances, reduces the master’s 
profits, he can curb their wages almost at will and can easily recoup from them what the 
fortunes of business take from him.  Should they choose to strike, the master, who is 
wealthy, is easily able to wait, without risk of ruin, until necessity brings them back since 
they must work every day so as not to die, for they own almost nothing but the strength 
of their arms.  Oppression has long since reduced them to poverty and, as they become 
poorer, they are easier to oppress—a vicious circle from which they cannot escape.”). 
247 According to the National Coalition on Health Care, most Americans with health 
insurance obtain coverage through their employers; however, as insurance costs rise and 
employers cut costs, the insurance becomes costlier for the employees or, in many cases, 
disappears altogether.  NAT’L COAL. ON HEALTH CARE, FACTS ON HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE 2 (2008), available at http://www.nchc.org/facts/coverage_fact_sheet_ 
2007.pdf  (“It is estimated that 266,000 companies dropped their health coverage between 
2000-2005.”).  The highly publicized spectre of thousands of employers single handedly 
eliminating their employees’ vital health insurance heightens all employees’ 
consciousness of the employers’ power over their bodily well-being. 
248 By “ideology,” we refer to the social ideology of the ruling class, as explained by 
Louis Althusser.  The social ideology is the social mindset required to reproduce the 
submission of the laborers to the rules of the established order; the social ideology must 
reproduce itself within the society to ensure its continued viability and, by extension, the 
continued repressive social order.  This ideology is reproduced by the Ideological State 
Apparatuses (ISAs), which are generally social institutions, such as the law, literature, 
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political parties, and the educational system, which lead the population to accept and 
reproduce the social ideology.  The ISAs “interpellate” the people, causing them to see 
themselves as within and defined by the social ideology.  Interpellation was first 
described by Althusser as analogous to the police’s “hailing” of a citizen; by turning 
around to the policeman’s “hey you,” the citizen has acknowledged and defined himself 
as a subject to that policeman’s—and thus to society’s—power.  See Louis Althusser, 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation), LA 
PENSÉE (1970), available at http://www.marx2mao.com/Other/LPOE70ii.html#s5.  
 For a more generalized description of ideology, see Mark Barenburg, Democracy and 
Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible 
Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 813 (1994) (“Ideology need not take the form of a 
system of descriptive and prescriptive propositions embodied in a reigning, abstract 
‘comprehensive view’ such as liberalism or socialism.  It can instead inhere in more 
practical, action-oriented systems of thought, feeling, and speech, in what . . . Pierre 
Bourdieu dubs ‘habitus’—the prereflective dispositions and discursive performances, the 
inarticulate, spontaneous practices and emotions that suffuse everyday experience.”). 
249 No single influence on the employee can account for the interpellation, but the total 
experience of being an employee creates the interpellating effect.  See Judith Butler, 
“Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All”, 88 YALE FRENCH STUD. 6, 6 (1995) 
(“[T]he ‘call’ arrives severally and in implicit and unspoken ways. . . . If we accept that 
[Althusser’s police hailing scene] is exemplary and allegorical, then it never needs to 
happen for its effectivity to be presumed. Indeed, if it is allegorical . . . then the process 
literalized by the allegory is precisely that which resists narration, that is, that exceeds the 
narrativizability of events.”). 
250 See KARL MARX, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, reprinted in THE 
MARX-ENGELS READER 66 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).   
The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more 
his production increases in power and range. . . . With the increasing value of 
the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world 
of men.  Labour produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the 
worker as a commodity—and does so in the proportion in which it produces 
commodities generally.   
This fact expresses merely that the object which labour produces—labour’s 
product—confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the 
producer.  The product of labour is labour which has been congealed in an 
object, which has become material: it is the objectification of labour. . . .  
. . . So much does objectification appear as loss of the object that the worker 
is robbed of the objects most necessary not only for his life but for his work….      
All these consequences are contained in the definition that the worker is 
related to the product of his labour as to an alien object.  For on this premise it 
is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful the alien 
objective world becomes which he creates over-against himself, the poorer he 
himself—his inner world—becomes, the less belongs to him as his own.  
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Id. at 71–72 (emphasis in original). 
251 Althusser, supra note 248, at 154 (“All ideological State apparatuses, whatever they 
are, contribute to the same result: the reproduction of the relations of production, i.e., of 
capitalist relations of exploitation.”).  Interestingly, Althusser points to traditional trade 
unions as a main Ideological State Apparatus, perhaps a prelude to Karl Klare’s argument 
that the labor law structure has played a key role in preventing the true liberation of 
workers from the repressive employment structure.  Id. at 142 n.7; see Karl E. Klare, 
Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 
INDUS. REL. L. J. 450 (1981). 
252 This production of ideology does not have the trappings of the type of coercion that 
the Board is currently willing to address.  See Barenburg, supra note 248, at 813 
(“[C]ompliance by a subordinate group [to the social ideology] need reflect neither 
coercion nor normative consent.”). 
253 Whether an actual “free choice” exists is also a question, if workers are always already 
a subject of the social ideology. “[F]or Althusser one is entered into the ‘ritual’ of 
ideology regardless of whether there is a prior and authenticating belief in that ideology.”  
JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 24 (1997).  
However, while labor law cannot extricate the worker from the problem of social 
ideology, labor law can alleviate, or at least refrain from exacerbating, the more 
damaging forms of ideological coercion. 
254 See supra Part III.A.4.a. 
255 See supra Part II.B. 
256 National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (“It is hereby declared to be 
the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstruction to 
the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they 
have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by 
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the 
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.”). 
257 Id. § 157 (“[Employees] shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such 
[organizing, collective bargaining, and concerted] activities.”). 
258 See To Create a National Labor Board, supra note 43, at 47 (statement of Sen. 
Wagner) (“I think it has been recognized that, due to our industrial growth, it is simply 
absured [sic] to say that an individual, one of 10,000 workers, is on an equality with his 
employer in bargaining for his wages.  The worker, if he does not submit to the 
employer’s terms, faces ruin for his family.  The so-called freedom of contract does not 
exist under such circumstances.  The only way that the worker will be accorded the 
freedom of contract to which, under our theory of government, he is entitled, is by the 
intrusion of the Government to give him that right, by protecting collective bargaining.  
When 10,000 come together and collectively bargain with the employer, then there is 
equality of bargaining power.”). 
259 See supra Part II.D. 
260 In social science this is known as the “observer effect.”  The observer effect is “[t]he 
difference that is made to an activity or a person by it being observed.  People may well 
not behave in their usual manner whilst aware of being watched, or when being 
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interviewed while carrying out an activity.  Many forms of research involve similar 
problems and allowing for these in interpretation is a key professional skill for 
researchers.”  Association for Qualitative Research, Observer Effect Definition, 
http://www.aqr.org.uk (follow “Library” hyperlink; then follow “Glossary of Terms” 
hyperlink; then follow “Observer Effect” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 24, 2008).  This 
effect is certainly not accounted for in current Board practices, which take a “snapshot” 
of the employees’ preference in a highly orchestrated process, rather than accounting for 
the effect of that process on the employees’ stated choice.  See supra Part III.A.2.  
261 As an analogy, the decision of whom to date may involve the weighing of numerous 
factors, many of which may be considered appropriate or inappropriate, depending on the 
circumstance and on the observer’s personal preference.  For example, is it appropriate to 
consider the potential date’s wealth?  Career prospects?  Habits?  Height?  Appearance?  
Age?  Gender?  Ability to reproduce?  Family status?  Whether the prospective date’s 
parent is carrying a loaded shotgun?  In any particular experiment, at least some of these 
factors must be deliberately overlooked because they are so integral to the choice as to 
make the decision meaningless without them.  However, it is impossible to delineate 
which factors would be appropriate in every situation (and must therefore be controlled 
such that the effect of other factors is measurable) and which would be inappropriate. 
262 If every circumstantial influence on the choice is coercive, laboratory conditions can 
only be achieved by flipping a coin. 
263 See supra Part III.A.4 for the Board’s lack of principle and use of policy preference in 
its policing of the electoral conditions. 
264 See John B. Thompson, Editor’s Introduction to PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND 
SYMBOLIC POWER 1, 14 (John B. Thompson ed., Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson 
trans., 1991) (“But when individuals act, they always do so in specific social contexts or 
settings.  Hence particular practices or perceptions should be seen, not as the product of 
the habitus [the “set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways,” 
which are inculcated in the person by society] as such, but as the product of the relation 
between the habitus, on the one hand, and the specific social contexts or ‘fields’ within 
which individuals act, on the other.”) (emphasis in orginal). 
265 It should be noted that this argument “proves too much” in the sense that it applies to 
any attempt to isolate “free choice” through a particular formal process, including the 
political elections commonplace in western countries.  This is only a fault if one believes 
that political elections in western countries successfully isolate “free choice.”  If so, 
which ones?  Proportional?  Majoritarian?  Plurality?  First-past-the-post?  Absolute 
majority?  Approval voting?  Single transferable?  Instant run-off? 
266 See Hurd & Uehlein, supra note 174. 
267 See 78 CONG. REC. 3443, 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 
LEG. HIST. WAGNER ACT, supra note 43, at 16 (“Simple, common sense tells us that a 
man does not possess this freedom [to act freely in his interest, bargain candidly] when he 
bargains with those who control his source of livelihood.”); see also ATLESON, supra 
note 30, at 178–89 (“The notion of contract stresses the voluntary exchange of freely 
bargained promises, appealing to values of individualism, while simultaneously 
completely ignoring the economic reality of the ‘bargain.’ . . . The worker has to sell his 
labour power to live whereas the employer is not similarly constrained to buy labour. . . 
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The asymmetry of the relation goes even further.  While the employee receives a defined 
rate for the job, the employer receives a potential whose ultimate development is largely 
for it to determine.  The employer’s side of the bargain is, therefore, essentially open 
ended.  While employers impose rules of great specificity which reduces employee 
discretion to minimal levels, employers possess maximum discretion in making decisions 
concerning the goals and methods of production and the behavior and rewards of all 
participants.  This asymmetry has been maintained by economic and state power.” 
(quotations omitted)). 
268 Roy Adams, Union Certification as an Instrument of Labor Policy: A Comparative 
Perspective, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 174, 
at 260, 266 (“The certification election is justified as being similar to a political election 
campaign, and the association with democratic political institutions provides an ethical 
basis for it.  Although this argument is convincing to many labor relations experts as well 
as members of the general public, it is, when closely examined, a specious analogy.  The 
political election campaign is designed to pick leaders who will develop policy within the 
institutional framework of a democratic system.  The certification election, by contrast, is 
more like a constitutional referendum.  The choice is not between leaders within an 
established political system but rather between political systems.  It is a choice between 
the perpetuation of industrial autocracy or the establishment of a form of industrial 
democracy.  Within a democratic society, no such choice should ever be seriously 
entertained.  Within a democratic society, the only legitimate discussion should be over 
the means for establishing industrial democracy and the type of plans that would qualify 
as democratic. . . . The implication of this argument is that the certification election has 
no legitimacy whatsoever because one of the choices available to the electors is to 
continue a system of organizational governance that is repugnant to democratic values.  
For those who cherish such values, and there are very few North Americans who do not, 
the labor law reform debate should focus on alternative means for the establishment of 
universal industrial democracy.  No consideration at all should be given to the 
continuation of an archaic industrial political system that has no place in a democratic 
society.” (citations omitted)). 
269 Comparison to totalitarianism has become a bit of a cliché, so we thought it necessary 
to clarify our use of this analogy.  Employment-at-will is not more oppressive than a 
totalitarian state; the totalitarian has direct control over life and death itself, while the 
employer only has control over livelihood.  While livelihood is of central importance, it is 
less important than death, and thus, the situation is substantially more coercive under 
totalitarianism.  However, the employer’s control over the livelihood of the employee is 
greater than the totalitarian’s control over life because the employer need take no 
affirmative action to terminate employment, but can simply stop paying for the work.  Cf. 
OFFICE SPACE (Twentieth Century Fox-Film Corp. 1999), available at http://www. 
awesomefilm.com/script/office_space_transcript.html (“Just a second there, Professor.  
We, uh, we fixed the glitch.  So he won’t be receiving a paycheck anymore.  So it’ll just 
work itself out naturally.”). 
270 See supra note 68 (citing the statement of purpose of the 1934 Wagner bill). 
271 By necessity, the outline that follows is just a very rough sketch suggesting the general 
direction that reforms should take to ensure employee freedom. 
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272 Unlike most similar schemes in other nations, we are of the opinion that smaller units 
(though in some sense less powerful) are better suited than large units for the kind of 
collective action that has the potential for ideological transformation.  Cf. OLSON, supra 
note 190, at 66–70 (arguing that small organizations are better suited to obtain collective 
goods). 
273 See Adams, supra note 268. 
